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Abstract 
School bonds provide an important mechanism of financing school capital 
projects. Bonds are paid back via future property taxes, which may or may not be 
associated with an increase in tax rates. Bond issues require voter support in local 
elections. Therefore, identifying factors related to bond approval is of great interest 
to school officials. This dissertation evaluates the literature on school bond elections, 
identifies methodological problems, and provides empirical applications to address 
these concerns.   
Chapter 1 presents an overview of current conditions of public school 
infrastructure and financing schemes in the United States. Underfunding of school 
facilities remains a problem. Generally, the funding burden for school capital 
expenses falls upon states and local districts. Many states provide building aid in the 
form of lump-sum grants and matching grants (Duncombe and Wang, 2009). Eleven 
states do not have any building aid programs. In these states, districts rely on bonds 
to finance school facilities. Oklahoma is one of the eleven states that does not 
provide building aid. Since it is representative of the states with primary reliance on 
school bonds, it serves as a good case for investigating factors associated with school 
bond approval.   
Chapter 2 focuses on voter turnout, an important factor associated with bond 
approval. The belief that high voter turnout reduces bond approval is widely held. 
xi 
 
This chapter identifies a potential estimation problem in examining the effect of 
turnout in the previous literature. Specifically, turnout is likely to be correlated with 
other important socio-demographic variables related to bond approval. The existing 
literature, however, is based on naïve regression estimates, which do not properly 
account for this relationship. Using an instrumental variable approach, I find that 
voter turnout only plays a negligible role in explaining bond approval. My results 
question the efficacy of get-out-to-vote campaigns and other voter turnout strategies, 
and suggest that these efforts may not be warranted. 
Chapter 3 highlights a potential selection problem in typical bond research. 
Specifically, school bond outcomes are observed conditional on the occurrence of 
bond elections. If unobservable attributes could potentially influence election 
participation and bond approval, then the characteristics of participating districts may 
not be representative of all school districts. Results from the existing literature may 
be suspect due to selectivity bias. As a result, I propose a two-stage model that 
distinguishes the bond approval (outcome stage) from the election participation 
(selection stage) and provides some insight regarding the effects of demographics in 
different stages. Even accounting for potential differences across school districts, 
selectivity bias is evident. To understand the mechanism by which election outcomes 
are achieved, self-selection needs to be given careful thought. 
xii 
 
Chapter 4 explores the relationship between local property values and school 
bond approval. Property values, as a measure of property tax base, are generally 
viewed as an important financing resource for school capital expenses in the bond 
literature. In addition, school amenities associated with increased school capital 
spending are capitalized into local property values. Therefore, property values may 
be endogenous to school bond approval. The traditional ordinary least squares model 
may conceal the true relationship between the two due to conflicting effects. 
Following an instrumental variable approach, I find that property values negatively 
influences bond approval, and such a negative effect may reflect community 
heterogeneity. 
Understanding and addressing the methodological problems in estimation is 
essential for informing policy related to school finance. My research explores 
interesting problems, addresses related concerns, and provides useful implications 
regarding school financing for policy makers. 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1: Motivation and Background 
 
1.1. Public School Conditions in the U.S. 
Ever since the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) released a 
report in 1999, the physical conditions of the U.S. public schools continue to attract 
nationwide attention. The NCES report presented an overview of the inadequate 
public school infrastructure across the country and estimated that a total of $127 
billion is needed to improve public school conditions. Another survey conducted by 
NCES in 2005 suggested that the physical conditions of buildings/size of classrooms 
had interfered with instruction to a moderate or major extent in one-fourth of the 
U.S. public schools, one-third of which depended on portable or temporary buildings 
(Digest of Education Statistics, 2009). Underfunding of school facilities continues to 
be a problem. Inadequate school infrastructure not only threatens student and teacher 
safety, but also hinders student learning (i.e. poor lighting in classrooms). In a speech 
given on February 14, 2011, President Obama emphasized the importance of 
building a 21
st
 century educational infrastructure. The eroding conditions of U.S. 
public schools will remain at the forefront of national policy. 
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1.2 School Financing System in the U.S  
Generally, the funding burden for school facilities falls upon states and local 
districts. States use a variety of mechanisms to finance school capital outlays, such as 
credit enhancement, state loans and building aid programs (Duncombe and Wang, 
2009). The most common form of credit enhancement is to offer bondholders first 
claim on some part of state apportions that go to a district in case of default. It is 
meant to raise the credit rating of a school district. States also offer loans or 
guarantees to school districts in order to lower their borrowing costs.  
While loans need to be paid back, state building aid does not. Building aid 
can be categorized into lump sum grants and matching grants. Some states use lump-
sum grants, which are a fixed amount per student within a school district. Others use 
matching grants that require a contribution from local districts. The matching rate is 
set at a predetermined level and is different across states. Among the 50 U.S. states, 
38 have state building aid programs, and Hawaii provides full state aid to its single 
school district. According to Table 1.1, 22 out of 38 states use matching grants, 
seven use lump-sum grants, and nine use both. Notably, eleven states do not provide 
state building aid for school capital outlay (Figure 1.1). As a result, funding 
responsibility for school facilities falls on local districts in these states.  
The primary mechanism of financing school infrastructure locally is to issue 
bonds, which are paid back with interest via future property tax collections. Bond 
3 
 
items are placed on ballots by district school boards for approval by local voters. 
Therefore, identifying strategies associated with bond approval is of great 
importance for securing school revenues and improving school conditions, especially 
for districts without state building aid.  
Oklahoma is one of the eleven states that does not provide state building aid. 
It has a total of 539 public school districts. School budgets rely on federal, state, and 
local apportions. While school revenues are mainly spent on instruction, 
administration and student support, little is apportioned for capital expenses. 
Compared with other states, per pupil capital outlay is low in Oklahoma, which ranks 
45
th
 among the 50 U.S. states (Figure 1.2). Consequently, Oklahoma serves as a good 
case study since it is representative of states with primary reliance on school bonds. 
 
1.3 School Bond Election Literature 
The process of conducting a school bond election consists of several steps: 1) 
a bond is proposed by district school board; 2) local voters vote on the bond and 3) if 
more than a certain percent of the voters cast ‘yes’ votes, 1 the bond is issued. 
Because school bonds are financed via future property taxes and bond issues require 
voter support, district, bond, voter, and election characteristics are used to explain 
bond outcomes in the literature. 
                                               
1
 The rates vary across states, e.g. 55% in California (Rueben and Cerdán, 2003) and Nebraska; 60% 
in Oklahoma, Iowa, Mississippi, New York, South Dakota, Washington, and West Virginia; 2/3 
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Despite the strong interest in school finance elections (budget and tax),
2
 
limited studies focus on bonds. Table 1.2 presents an overview of these studies, all of 
which are conducted at the district level. Theobald and Meier (2002) identify many 
factors relevant for school bond outcomes in Texas, including demographics, school 
needs, costs, and financial resources within a district. Similarly, Rueben and Cerdán 
(2003) find that voter support for school bonds varies with election timing, issuing 
purposes, and district regions. Beckham and Maiden (2003) highlight the importance 
of technology expenditure. Bond approval is found to increase with the percent of 
revenues specified for technology support.  
Button and Rosenbaum (1989) examine the impact of elderly population on 
school bond approval in Florida, which has a large population of resettled retirees. 
Senior citizens are believed to be opponents of school bonds because they are 
unlikely to benefit from school capital spending, and such economic self-interest is 
reflected in their voting behavior. This is known as the “grey peril” hypothesis. 
Button and Rosenbaum distinguish senior permanent residents from those recent 
arrivals and find that bond passing likelihood rises with the population of senior 
permanent residents who might be loyal to local communities. 
                                               
2
 See for instance: Cataldo and Holm, 1983; Button, 1993; Tedin, Matland, and Weiher, 2001; Sielke, 
Dayton, Holmes, and Jefferson, 2001; Ehrenberg, Ehrenberg, Smith, and Zhang, 2002; Crader, 
Holloway, and A Stauffacher, 2002; Davis and Tyson, 2003; Berkman and Plutzer, 2004; Johnson, 
2008. 
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Locale differences (e.g. urban, suburban, and rural areas) are also relevant for 
school bond outcomes. Lentz (1999) defines the land use typology (locale) in Illinois 
on the basis of property tax composition and studies bond approval within each 
locale group. Suburban and small rural districts are likely to provide greater voter 
support for school bonds because the land use is relatively homogenous in these 
areas in Illinois. For instance, 73% of the land is agricultural in small rural areas, and 
82% is residential in suburbs. Property-owners bear the same property taxes in these 
communities, so they are likely to share similar views about school capital expenses. 
Maher and Skidmore (2008) evaluate the effect of a policy change on school 
bond outcomes. Due to a new school-financing scheme implemented in Wisconsin in 
1996-1997, the main funding burden of school expenditure was shifted from local 
districts to state governments. This favorable change leads to a reduction in school 
tax price
3
 in some districts, and thus increases the probability of passing school 
bonds.  
Bowers, Metzger, and Militello (2010) investigate the differences in passing 
likelihoods between new bonds and re-submitted bonds following a discrete time 
hazard design. A bond is considered to be resubmitted if it is placed on a ballot again 
within a certain period (i.e., 12 months) since its last failure. It is found that new 
bonds are more likely to pass, compared to re-submitted bonds. 
                                               
3
 It is defined as the amount needed from local property tax revenue, for the purpose of rising school 
spending by $1 (Maher and Skidmore, 2008). 
6 
 
Among these aggregate studies of bond outcomes, two common empirical 
approaches are used: Logistic and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. In the 
Logistic Regressions, the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable set to one for 
bond success and zero otherwise. See, for example, research by Theobald and Meier 
(2002) and Bowers Metzger, and Militello (2010). In terms of the OLS regressions, 
the dependent variable is bond approval share in an election. For instance, see papers 
by Button and Rosenbaum (1989) and Beckham and Maiden (2003). Compared with 
the dichotomous variable where only two outcomes are observed, the approval share 
provides more information about the extent of voter support for school capital 
projects. Hence, in my study, the approval share is the outcome variable of primary 
interest. The limited dependent variable approach is studied as a complement to my 
main investigation.  
To date, limited empirical research has been done in the area of school bond 
elections. This dissertation evaluates the literature on school bond elections, 
identifies methodological problems, and provides empirical applications to address 
these concerns. 
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Table 1.1: Capital spending per pupil across U.S. states by building aid category 
 
State building aid 
No state  
building aid  
($451.55)  
 
Lump sum grants 
($729.88) 
Matching grants 
($607.95) 
Both  
($567.00) 
 
Arizona Alaska Alabama  Idaho 
Florida California Arkansas Iowa 
Hawaii* Connecticut Colorado Louisiana 
Indiana Delaware Kentucky Michigan 
South Carolina Georgia Minnesota Missouri 
Tennessee Illinois Mississippi Nebraska 
Utah Kansas Montana Nevada 
West Virginia Maine New Mexico North Dakota 
 
Maryland North Carolina Oklahoma 
 
Massachusetts Ohio Oregon 
 
New Hampshire 
 
South Dakota 
 
New Jersey 
  
 
New York 
  
 
Pennsylvania 
  
 
Rhode Island 
  
 
Texas 
  
 
Vermont 
  
 
Virginia 
  
 
Washington 
  
 
Wisconsin 
  
 
Wyoming 
   
Source: Duncombe and Wang (2009); School District Finance Survey for School Year 2006-07, 
FY2007, US Department of Education.  
Note: Hawaii provides full state building aid on school capital outlay. 
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Figure 1.2 
 
Source: School District Finance Survey for School Year 2006-07, FY2007, US Department of 
Education. 
Note: States without building aid are highlighted (with boxes). These states as a whole have lower per 
pupil capital spending on average. 
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Chapter 2: Does Voter Turnout Matter for School Bond Outcomes? 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the role of voter turnout in explaining school bond 
election outcomes. Turnout, measured as the proportion of electorate voting in an 
election, is widely believed to be negatively associated with bond approval. 
Individuals mostly likely to vote for school bonds are those more vested in school 
activities, such as teachers, school officials, parents, and PTA members. The voting 
power of these likely supporters diminishes as voter turnout from the general 
population increases. When not held in conjunction with national or state general 
elections, turnout for school bond elections is relatively low because only individuals 
with a strong enough interest bother to vote. Consequently, school administrators 
give careful attention to factors related to voter turnout. For instance, they tend to 
schedule special elections for school bonds to avoid other ballot items 
and target supportive voter groups via get-out-to-vote campaigns.  
Unfortunately, a concern associated with the previous literature is that the 
role of voter turnout may be misleading. A typical model of school bond approval 
includes turnout as well as other social demographic factors related to bond 
outcomes. A problem arises if voter turnout is correlated with these factors. For 
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example, voter turnout and the percent of population with a high school degree are 
included in the empirical model of Bowers, Metzger, and Militello (2010). If less 
educated citizens are less likely to vote, then there is collinearity between the two 
variables. Similar correlation exists between turnout and other explanatory factors, 
such as district average income, educational attainment, locale, etc. Collinearity is 
not a big issue as long as turnout is not a perfect combination of other explanatory 
variables.  
In addition, omitted variable bias is another concern. Turnout may be 
correlated with omitted variables that are related to bond approval, e.g. the percent of 
families whose children attend private schools. If these families are likely to go to 
polls and vote against public school spending, then ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates would be inconsistent. Other potential omitted variables include average 
length of residence and percent of childless families. Furthermore, unobserved 
characteristics, such as attitude toward taxation, may impact bond approval as well 
as voter turnout decisions.  
To the extent that voter turnout is potentially correlated with omitted and/or 
unobserved characteristics, the assumption of independence between explanatory 
variables and error term is violated. The previous research does not account for this 
potential correlation, so the results may be misleading concerning the turnout effect. 
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Accordingly, I use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to isolate the role of voter 
turnout from other social demographic factors and to see if the previous estimates are 
robust to accounting for these concerns. 
My study contributes to the literature and policy realm by investigating the 
de-facto turnout-approval relationship using the outcomes of 662 school bond 
elections from Oklahoma between 1997 and 2009. Using an ordinary least squares 
approach as a benchmark, a negative and significant relationship is found between 
voter turnout and bond approval. In contrast, using an instrumental variable 
approach, no significant correlation is identified. This evidence questions the 
importance of voter turnout and suggests that efforts to promote turnout among 
target groups may not be warranted.  
 
2.2 Literature on Voter Turnout in School Bond Elections 
The theory underlying the turnout-approval relationship is the median voter 
model (Black, 1948), where the preference of the median voter dominates voting 
outcomes. In terms of school bonds, a super majority approval (60%) is required for 
bond issues. Therefore, preference of the 60-percentile voter determines the 
outcomes of bond elections. Nevertheless, school officials are capable of scheduling 
special elections and targeting specific voter groups, so the median voter of the 
16 
 
targeted groups may be different from that of the whole population. Accordingly, the 
preference of the median voter may change as voter turnout varies, so do school 
bond outcomes. 
Turnout fluctuates considerably across school bond elections. The substantial 
differences in turnout rates and diverging election outcomes have attracted enormous 
research interest. Many studies explore and investigate the empirical connection 
between voter turnout and bond approval. The results are inconclusive (Table 2.1).  
Piele and Hall (1973) summarize the findings of early research (1950-1970), 
which examines the turnout-approval relationship in both school bond and budget 
elections. Among the eighteen studies, half find a significant and negative 
relationship, six find an insignificant one, and three find contradictory results. The 
majority of early studies supports the belief that high voter turnout reduces bond 
approval. After examining the quality of data used in these studies, such as the type 
of elections, number of elections, geographic coverage, time period, and unit of 
analysis, Piele and Hall conclude that bond approval falls with voter turnout. High 
turnout implies community conflict, which may bring out demographic groups that 
are likely to oppose school capital spending. 
Although the negative relationship between voter turnout and bond approval 
is widely accepted, other studies also find evidence of a positive relationship in large 
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districts in metropolises, e.g., Cleveland, Detroit, and Grand Rapids.
4
 One possible 
explanation is the incremental turnout theory developed by Spinner (1967). 
According to the theory, election failures are most likely to occur at intermediate 
turnout levels due to an increased participation of tax opponents. As voter turnout 
continues to rise, potential ‘yes’ voters will outnumber tax opponents, and a positive 
turnout-approval relationship may emerge.  
Stone (1965) considers the relationship between high turnout and bond 
outcomes to be indeterminate. Although he conducts his research in the context of 
political elections, his theory applies to school finance elections. High turnout 
inevitably includes (political) in-activists who are poorly informed. Because their 
preferences are volatile and hard to predict, so are the election outcomes.  
To reconcile the diverging research findings, Hamilton and Cohen (1974) 
suggest that the turnout-approval correlation is not robust. In fact, it depends on the 
composition of the electorate, especially the voter characteristics at low and high 
turnout levels. 
Notably, early research (50s-70s) generally examines the turnout-approval 
relationship on the basis of summary statistics and data comparisons. However, these 
methods do not rule out the potential influence of other relevant factors, e.g. district 
                                               
4
 The research is summarized in Hamilton and Cohen (1974, p76). 
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demographics, so the corresponding results are likely to change when relevant 
factors are included. 
Recent studies investigate the relationship using regression analysis, 
accounting for potential important factors in a more comprehensive way. Lentz 
(1999) defines a school district’s locale (urban, suburban, and rural areas) according 
to its property tax composition and studies bond approval within each locale 
category. Among the factors that influence bond approval, she finds that a 
referendum is less likely to pass if it is held on the same date as a general (primary) 
election, where voter turnout is remarkably high. Though high turnout may bring out 
the median voters of the voting population, these voters may be disinterested in 
school capital spending and are not in favor of school bonds.  
Bowers, Metzger, and Militello (2010) employ a design of discrete time 
hazard to investigate the different passing likelihoods between new bonds and 
resubmitted bonds, using data from Michigan. During their examination, a 
significant and negative relationship emerges between voter turnout and bond 
outcomes. This evidence is consistent with the conventional wisdom that low turnout 
is associated with a greater chance of bond approval. Results from recent studies 
(Lentz, 1999; Bowers, Metzger, and Militello, 2010) support the majority findings of 
early research.  
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Unfortunately, a potential estimation problem exists when studying the 
impact of voter turnout in the previous literature. Specifically, turnout is likely to be 
correlated with other important social demographic variables related to bond 
approval. A naïve OLS approach does not account for this potential correlation. 
Therefore, an IV method is used to reveal the true turnout-approval relationship. 
 
2.3. Empirical Specification 
2.3.1 Model 
At the school district level, the baseline model is specified as follows: 
itititit XturnoutvoterApproval   210                                     (2.1)  
The unit of observation is a school bond election held in school district i in 
year t. The variable Approval is the share of yes votes in a school bond election. It 
indicates the extent of voter support for school capital expenses. The variable it  is 
an error term, and the set X
it
 includes factors associated with bond approval, such as 
district demographics, school needs, and bond/election characteristics. Turnout is 
one of the explanatory factors that are relevant for school bond approval.  
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2.3.2 Data 
My Oklahoma bond data come from two sources. The primary source is 
hand-collected data, generously provided by Rogers and Burge.
5
 Their data 
collection efforts entailed going to the county election boards, digging through 
records to pull out local fiscal ballots, and collecting detailed bond information at the 
school district level. Although the bond data have a small geographic coverage 
(17/77 counties in Oklahoma),
6
 the district level bond records are almost complete in 
covered areas. 
The second source is a consulting company, Stephen H. McDonald and 
Associates. The company helps many school districts issue bonds in Oklahoma and 
collects information from districts that use its service. Although the provided data 
cover a wider geographic area (482/539 districts in all 77 counties in Oklahoma), the 
information is selective rather than comprehensive regarding bond elections in the 
state. For instance, according to Rogers and Burge, there are a total of 645 school 
bond elections held in 17 counties between 1997 and 2009, while the consulting 
company only documents 294 of them (Figure 2.1). Therefore, the company data 
                                               
5 Rogers and Burge are professors at the Department of Economics, University of Oklahoma. 
6
 Most of Oklahoma’s population is located in these seventeen counties, including Canadian, 
Cleveland, Creek, Grady, Kingfisher, Lincoln, Logan, McClain, Oklahoma, Okmulgee, Osage, 
Pawnee, Payne, Pottawatomie, Rogers, Tulsa, and Wagoner. 
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may be problematic to the extent that observations are not randomly collected.
7
 
Therefore, I combined bond data from both sources to get more complete coverage 
for the counties covered by Rogers and Burge.  
Notably, a school bond election may include multiple bond measures. If each 
initiative item is treated as an independent observation, the information contained by 
measures on the same ballot would be highly correlated, e.g., number of total votes 
and yes votes. In addition, the district demographic variables used to explain bond 
outcomes are the same for those measures. To address these concerns, multiple bond 
measures on the same ballot are consolidated into a single representative bond, 
calculated as the weighted average according to their issuing values. This approach 
puts greater weight on the more expensive bonds. The final sample includes 662 
school bond elections from 17 counties (151 districts) between1997 and 2009. Table 
2.2 displays the number of (consolidated) bond elections held in each school district 
during the sample period, and Figure 2.2 shows the distribution. 
Typically, there are two types of bonds: general capital bonds and 
transportation bonds. General capital bonds are issued for diverse purposes, such as 
facility improvement, restoration, new construction, and the purchasing of new 
equipment, while transportation bonds are issued only for one purpose: school 
                                               
7
 Even though the company data are representative, it’s not desirable for my analysis. When 
constructing the lags of turnout as instruments (section 2.3), incomplete data are a big problem. 
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buses/vans. On average, capital bonds have larger issuing values than transportation 
bonds ($2,014 vs. $274 per pupil), and the number of elections for capital bonds is 
twice as many as that of the transportation bonds (662 vs. 332).
8
 Given the diverse 
issuing purposes, higher issuing values, and larger number of elections, capital bonds 
are examined separately from transportation bonds (Sample 1). In the robustness 
checks section, both types of bonds are studied (Sample 2 and 3). 
The variable of primary interest, voter turnout, has been measured in different 
ways in the literature (Geys, 2006): (1) number of total votes divided by the voting 
age population; (2) number of total votes divided by the size of electorate (registered 
voters); and (3) absolute number of votes cast. Among these, the first one is the most 
commonly used due to the ease of constructing it with official data. Therefore, voter 
turnout is constructed in the same way in this study. However, my data only cover 
the voting age population (18 and above) in the census year (2000). To approximate 
the voting population in other years, total population is multiplied by the voting age 
ratio in 2000. 
In addition to voter turnout, other explanatory variables ( X
it
) related to bond 
approval include district demographics, school needs, and bond (election) 
characteristics. Oklahoma school district demographics are obtained from the Office 
                                               
8
 Although both types of bonds are likely to be on the same ballot, half of the bond elections only 
include capital bonds. 
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of Accountability, which reports community characteristics, school educational 
processes, and student performance in its publication: School and District Report 
Card. Table 2.3 details the variable descriptions and sources, and Table 2.4 displays 
the summary statistics.  
District demographic variables include property values, debt service, district 
locale, etc. Property values reflect the financial resources in a school district. Studies 
suggest that the probability of passing school bonds increases with the available 
resources, that is, property values (Lentz, 1999; Theobald and Meier, 2002; Maher 
and Skidmore, 2009). Debt indicates an unbalanced budget, which raises the need for 
additional support, though voters are reluctant to expand debt if the current size is 
large (Theobald and Meier, 2002).  
School district locale ranges from “big city” to “rural” as defined by the 
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). Bowers, Metzger, and Militello 
(2010) divide all school districts into three categories, urban/suburban, town, and 
rural districts. In contrast, my study has more detailed locale specifications, e.g., city, 
suburb, rural fringe, rural distant, rural remote, town fringe, and town distant.
9
 My 
sample (151 districts) has almost complete coverage of suburban/urban areas but 
                                               
9
 40 out of 662 bond elections were held in urban districts, including small and big cities. Because the 
number of observations is limited, they are combined into one city category, as are the small, medium 
and large suburbs. The rest of the categories follow the NCES classification. 
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only partial coverage of town/rural areas. Out of 539 public school districts in 
Oklahoma, the sample includes all suburban districts (16), 6 of the 9 city districts, 9 
of the 12 town fringe districts, 13 of the 49 town distant districts, 38 of the 63 rural 
fringe districts, 65 of the 202 rural distant districts, and 10 of the 149 rural remote 
districts.  
Locale differences are relevant for school bond outcomes. The composition 
of property tax base may vary on the basis of district locale. For instance, rural areas 
rely on agricultural property in the tax base, while urban districts depend on business 
and residential property. As the composition of the property tax base varies, voter 
support may fluctuate since owners of different types of property may have 
diverging views regarding school capital spending (Lentz, 1999).   
Another indicator, “no high school”, implies districts that do not offer 
secondary education. 28 out of the 151 school districts in my sample do not have a 
high school (Table 2.5). These districts are small in terms of population size (1,823 
vs. 22,595 on average). Therefore, they share the upper grade educational services 
with neighboring unified school districts, which provide education to children of all 
school ages.  
School needs are captured by enrollment growth rate (Lentz, 1999; Zimmer 
and Jones, 2005) and student density, both of which are expected to be positively 
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associated with bond approval. A high enrollment growth rate implies a big increase 
in student population. Therefore, districts may require more capital spending to 
accommodate the increased demand. The growth rate measures the relative school 
demand, and the absolute demand is captured by student density, which is defined as 
the number of students per square mile within a school district. On average, 
urban/suburban areas have denser student populations (10722.58 vs. 1173.57 per sq. 
miles). Accordingly, districts in these areas may request capital spending more 
frequently in order to meet the need.  
Bond and election characteristics include issuing values and years since the 
last bond election. According to the previous research (Theobald and Meier, 2002; 
Bowers, Metzger, and Militello, 2010), bond support falls as issuing values rise. 
Years measure the time interval between the last and current school bond elections. 
It is anticipated to be positively associated with bond approval since a longer period 
suggests that school districts haven’t requested support recently.  
 
2.3.3 Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach  
Given the potential correlation between voter turnout and other observed 
and/or unobserved characteristics, an instrumental variable approach helps isolate the 
role of turnout from other demographic variables. A possible instrument is the lag of 
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voter turnout. Voting is habitual, and past voting behavior helps predict future voting 
behavior. Based on a Meta-analysis of 83 empirical studies conducted at various 
levels of aggregation (school district, municipality, state, and country), Geys (2006) 
finds that previous voter turnout is positively associated with current turnout. The 
positive relationship is also supported in an individual level study (Matsusaka and 
Palda, 1999).  
My sample starts in 1997. To obtain the lag of turnout, bond information is 
traced back to 1990, and two lags are constructed. Lag 1 refers to the turnout in the 
previous bond election in the same district rather than a strictly one-year lag, and Lag 
2 refers to the turnout in the bond election before the previous one.
10
 Out of 662 
bond elections, 59 do not have enough lags (lag 2) to be included in the analysis. 
Therefore, my analysis is based on a smaller sample (603). 
Another possible instrument is weather. Gomez, Hansford, and Krause 
(2007) investigate the relationship between weather conditions and voter turnout at 
the county level. Based on fourteen U.S. presidential elections, they find that election 
day bad weather (rain or snow) deters voter participation due to inconvenience. On 
the other hand, after examining four consecutive Canadian national elections at the 
individual level, Matsusaka and Palda (1999) do not find evidence of a negative 
                                               
10
 On average, the previous bond election happened 2.5 years ago, and the election before the 
previous one occurred 4.6 years ago. 
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correlation between inclement weather
11
 and voter turnout. In fact, Knack (1994) 
suggests that a strong sense of civic duty drives people to vote in elections regardless 
of the high voting cost associated with bad weather. 
Though the relationship between weather and turnout is not clear (It may be 
weakly correlated), weather is considered as a potential instrument in my study. 
Daily weather information is acquired from Oklahoma Mesonet (www.mesonet.org), 
and several measures are constructed. To obtain weather conditions at the school 
district level, weather stations are matched to district boundaries using ArcGIS 
software. Mesonet sites are layered on top of the school districts to create a "buffer" 
of 30 km around each Mesonet station. This buffer range was chosen so that most 
districts would have one Mesonet station within their boundaries. If a school district 
has only one station located within its boundary, weather information is obtained 
from that station (Figure 2.3). If there are more than one station, data are averaged. 
For districts that do not lie within the 30-mile range, data from the nearest station are 
used. Table 2.6 displays the corresponding weather station(s) for each school district 
in 17 counties. 
                                               
11
 Matsusaka and Palda (1999) use various factors to measure the election day weather conditions, 
including the mean, minimum, and maximum daily temperature, the deviation of the election day 
temperature from the monthly average, and the amount of precipitation. 
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Weather variables include daily rainfall (Gomez, Hansford, and Krause, 
2007), the absolute deviation of daily temperature from the normal average of the 
date (Knack 1994) and the absolute deviation from the monthly average (Matsusaka 
and Palda, 1999). When daily temperature is too far away from the average, weather 
is likely to be bad and voter participation may be deterred. However, a cool day in 
summer or a warm day in winter may actually encourage people to go out and vote. 
Since the absolute deviation variables do not specify whether a temperature is below 
or above the average, the deviation effects on voter turnout may cancel out, resulting 
in insignificant estimates. Therefore, to distinguish from those special cases (cool 
summer and warm winter), a variable indicating extreme weather circumstances is 
added to the model. A dummy is set to one if the maximum daily temperature is 
greater (smaller) than 90 (30) degrees and zero otherwise. Extremely warm (cold) 
weather is expected to discourage voter turnout and this usually occurs in 
August/September (January). However, school semesters also begin in these months, 
and parents are more engaged in school related activities. In fact, turnout rates are 
higher in these months. For instance, in my sample, average turnout is 17.5% for 
January, August, and September, and 13% for other months, though the difference is 
not statistically significant. Turnout is also high in November (17%). School bond 
elections concur with general elections in this month, but bond elections are 
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scheduled on the third Tuesday in order to avoid general elections (Oklahoma 
Statutes). Given these concerns, a dummy is included to isolate the month effect 
from the weather effect. It is set to one if a bond election is held in January, August, 
September, and November, and zero otherwise.
12
 Table 2.7 presents the summary 
statistics of weather variables.  
To validate the application of the IV estimation technique, I employ a 
Hausman test to examine the correlation between voter turnout and other unobserved 
and/or omitted characteristics. 
 
2.3.3.1 Validation of the Instrumental Variable Approach 
Turnout is regressed on the proposed instruments and explanatory variables 
to obtain the residuals, which are added to the baseline model. The coefficient on the 
residual in the augmented OLS regression is statistically significant (Table 2.8), 
suggesting that turnout and the error are correlated. Thus, the OLS estimates are 
inconsistent, and an IV approach is appropriate for estimating the turnout effect.  
 
                                               
12 The dummy is used to capture the high turnout rates in those months due to the beginning of new 
school semesters and general elections. Turnout in these months is considered as a whole and 
compared with that in other months. Additionally, a set of twelve-month dummies (categorical 
dummies) is also studied. The dummy set and the single dummy contribute similarly to the overall 
explanatory power of the model. So, the categorical month effect is fully captured by the single 
dummy. 
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2.3.3.2 Under-identification and Weak Instruments Tests 
A valid instrument must be correlated with the variable that needs to be 
instrumented, voter turnout in this case. To test this condition, current turnout is 
regressed on the suggested instruments and other explanatory variables. Instruments 
include the lag of voter turnout and weather. Table 2.9 presents the results. The 
estimated coefficients of lags are positive and statistically different from zero. The 
weather instruments, however, are not important in explaining voter turnout.
13
 This 
suggests that weather impacts turnout slightly, consistent with the findings of 
Matsusaka and Palda (1999). Given the strong correlation between the instruments 
(lags) and voter turnout, the null hypotheses of the under-identification and weak 
instruments tests can be rejected. 
 
2.3.3.3 Over-identification Test 
A second condition is that the instruments should be exogenous to the bond 
approval equation. To evaluate this condition, residuals obtained from the baseline 
model are regressed on the instruments and explanatory variables. The estimated 
coefficients are not different from zero, with a Hansen J statistic of 0.067 (P value: 
                                               
13 The month dummy is significant, but it captures the month effect rather than the weather effect. 
31 
 
79%, Table 2.9). As a result, the null hypothesis that instruments are exogenous to 
the bond equation cannot be rejected.  
The analysis presented here suggests that the proposed instruments (lags) are 
valid and an IV approach produces consistent estimates. Accordingly, lag 1 and lag 2 
will be used to instrument voter turnout in the analysis to follow. 
 
2.4. Results 
2.4.1 Empirical Results 
Table 2.10 reports the results. Time effects are included in all regressions. 
Estimated coefficients of independent variables have the expected signs related to 
bond approval. Column (1) presents the OLS estimate, which is negative and 
significant; consistent with the conventional wisdom that high turnout reduces bond 
approval. A one percent increase in the voter turnout rate corresponds to a 0.23 
percent decrease in bond approval share.  
Nevertheless, such estimates are inconsistent due to the potential correlation 
between voter turnout and other omitted and/or unobserved characteristics. Reliable 
IV estimates are reported in columns (2) and (3), where lags of turnout are used as 
instruments. Coefficients of the instrumented turnout approach zero and fail to attain 
the standard levels of statistical significance (-0.007/-0.004, Table 2.10). The 
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substantial declines in the magnitudes of estimates indicate that voter turnout only 
plays a negligible role in explaining bond approval. 
The results are surprising given the careful attention given to voter turnout by 
school officials. In fact, one of the school bond campaign strategies is to target 
specific voter groups for the purpose of support. For instance, it is common practice 
to encourage PTA members to call other parents to remind them to vote. My results 
cast doubt on the conventional wisdom that turnout matters and suggest that bond 
approval is mostly driven by district social-demographic factors. Accordingly, efforts 
to solicit support from targeted voters may not be warranted.  
Relating to district locale, IV regressions produce similar coefficients as the 
OLS results. Districts in rural fringe areas have the highest bond approval shares, 
while urban districts have the lowest (0.687 vs. 0.617, column (2), Table 2.10). In 
contrast, other studies find that urban districts are more likely to support school 
capital expenses (Zimmer and Jones, 2005; Bowers, Metzger, and Militello, 2010). 
Different findings between this and other studies may reflect the underlying 
differences in samples (Oklahoma vs. Michigan bonds). Nevertheless, my results are 
in line with the findings of Lentz (1999), which support the view that small rural 
areas are more likely to pass school referenda due to homogenous land use in these 
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communities.
14
 Property owners who bear the same property taxes (agricultural) are 
likely to have similar opinions about school bonds. 
 The estimated coefficients of other variables change slightly under the IV 
specifications. The two variables that capture school needs, enrollment growth rate 
and student density, are positively related to bond approval. As demand for school 
facilities rises, approval shares increase. Years since the last election also have a 
positive impact on bond approval. If a district waits a longer period to issue new 
bonds, voters tend to provide greater support for school bonds. Debt reflects a 
district’s taxability (Bowers, Metzger, and Militello, 2010). If school districts tax 
themselves heavily in the past, they may support future taxes as well.  
The rest of the explanatory variables are negatively related to bond approval, 
including bond-issuing value and the “no high school” dummy. Large bond issuing 
values reduce approval shares. Estimated coefficients are somewhat larger under the 
IV regressions (0.0405 vs. 0.073, column (2), Table 2.10). A one standard deviation 
increase in per pupil bonds value ($3240, column (2), Table 2.10) is associated with 
a decrease of 2.4 percent in bond approval shares. The “no high school” dummy 
indicates districts that only provide elementary education. Most of them are rural 
                                               
14 In Illinois, 73% of the land is agricultural in these small rural areas.  
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districts with a small population (1,823 vs. 22,595 on average) and are likely to have 
low demand for school capital expenses.  
Other demographics, such as property value per pupil, educational 
attainment, poverty level, and pupil-teacher ratio, are also considered in the analysis 
to account for the potential differences across school districts, but none of them are 
significant at the conventional levels of statistical significance. To further investigate 
the turnout-approval relationship, several robustness checks are explored below. 
 
2.4.2 Robustness Checks 
Due to the differences in capital and transportation bonds, the previous 
analysis is conducted on the basis of capital bonds. In this section, samples are 
expanded to both types of bonds. Specifically, sample 2 combines bond measures 
(both capital and transportation bonds) on a single ballot into one representative 
bond by weighting their issuing values. The validation of the IV approach is shown 
in Table 2.11. Once again, the coefficient on the augmented residual is statistically 
significant. The first stage results and IV estimates are displayed in Tables 2.12 and 
2.13, respectively. In addition, sample 3 treats each bond measure on a ballot as an 
independent observation. Because the information is highly correlated for measures 
on the same ballot, regression errors are clustered at the school district level. Table 
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2.14 confirms the application of the IV approach. Tables 2.15 and 2.16 repeat the 
regressions from Tables 2.9 and 2.10. Both coefficients on the instrumented voter 
turnout are close to zero and are highly insignificant. The negative turnout-approval 
relationship is not robust to the IV specifications. 
Furthermore, the previous research typically adopts a limited dependent 
variable approach in examining school bond outcomes. To evaluate the importance 
of the specification of the outcome variable, a Probit regression is estimated. The 
dependent variable in this case is dichotomous, i.e., one for success and zero for 
failure.
15
 Table 2.17 displays the estimation results using lag1 and the month dummy 
as instruments.
16
 Again, the IV estimates of voter turnout are small in magnitude and 
are not significant at the standard levels. 
Results presented in this section demonstrate that the connection between 
voter turnout and bond approval is weak, and it is robust to various samples. 
Although a significant and negative relationship is found under the traditional OLS 
model, the relationship almost disappears under the IV specifications (Tables 2.10, 
2.13, 2.16, and 2.27). To the degree that voter turnout and bond outcomes could be 
driven by the same set of social demographic factors, it is important to correct the 
estimation bias. The estimates of other explanatory variables change slightly. 
                                               
15
 In Oklahoma, a school bond passes if the approval share is greater than or equal to 60%. 
16 According to the Wald test statistics, instruments are exogenous to the bond approval equation. 
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2.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Voter turnout has been the focus of election policy for a long time. Numerous 
studies have explored the connection between voter turnout and school finance 
outcomes (Piele and Hall, 1973; Hamilton and Cohen, 1974). However, my study 
calls attention to the underlying relationship between voter turnout and other social 
demographic factors related to bond approval. Using unique Oklahoma school bond 
data, I find a potential modeling flaw that may contribute to the misleading policy 
conclusion regarding the importance of voter turnout. My results provide little 
support for get-out-to-vote campaigns and other voter turnout strategies.  
Notably, my data are limited to 17 of 77 counties in Oklahoma. During the 
period of interest (1997-2009), 563/662 school bonds passed, authorizing a total 
bond value of $4.27 billion. Although fewer bonds were approved during the recent 
economic downturn (2007-2009), the average issuing value per pupil increased 
throughout the period (Figure 2.4). Bonds become increasingly important for local 
school finance and school conditions. Understanding the links between bond passage 
and relevant factors is essential for informing policy strategies, and proper model 
specification helps avoid advocating ineffective ones.  
More broadly, the problem proposed here is not limited to school bond 
studies. It also applies to other elections of various types, e.g., elections for sales 
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taxes, fluoridation, and hospitals. To the extent that voter turnout is potentially 
correlated with other social demographic factors related to election outcomes, 
misspecification problems are likely to arise. My study suggests the use of an 
instrumental variable approach to investigate the turnout effect in outcomes of 
interest. 
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Table 2.1: Literature on the relationship between voter turnout and bond outcomes  
Voter 
Turnout 
 
 
Significant 
 
Insignificant 
 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Piele & Hall 
(1973) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spinner (1967), Marlowe (1970), Wills (1967-68) 
 
Beal et al. (1966),  
Turner (1968); 
Murphy (1966); 
Stone (1965); 
Boskoff & Zeigler 
(1964);  
Hanhn (1968); 
 
 
 
 
 
Carter et al.  
(1960, 1961, 1966);  
Lieber (1967);  
Wentzel (1964);  
Barbour (1966);  
Goettel (1971);  
Crider (1967);  
Minar (1966);  
Jordan (1966);  
Dykstra (1964); 
 
Hamilton & 
Cohen 
(1974) 
Spinner (1967) 
Stone (1965); 
Boskoff & Zeigler 
(1964); 
The Oregan data 
(1972); 
Ginocchio (1970);  
Agger (1969);  
Miller (1967);  
Kearney & Hattington 
(1857);  
Martin (1950);  
Lamka (1957);  
Sigel (1960);  
Flinn (1970); 
Levin (1960); 
Carter & Savard 
(1961);  
The California data 
(1968-1972); 
 
Recent 
studies 
 
 
 
Lentz (1999); 
Bowers et al. (2010); 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gong 
(2012) 
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Table 2.2: Frequencies of consolidated school bond elections in 151 school districts in 
Oklahoma, 1997-2009 
 
 
County 
 
District 
Number 
of bond 
elections 
 
County District 
Number 
of bond 
elections 
Canadian Banner 3 
 
Grady Friend 4 
Canadian Calumet 2 
 
Grady Middleberg 3 
Canadian El Reno 5 
 
Grady Minco 5 
Canadian Maple 1 
 
Grady Ninnekah 4 
Canadian Mustang 8 
 
Grady Pioneer 2 
Canadian Piedmont 5 
 
Grady Rush Springs 8 
Canadian Riverside 1 
 
Grady Tuttle 4 
Canadian Union City 3 
 
Grady Verden 4 
Canadian Yukon 5 
 
Kingfisher Dover 3 
Cleveland Lexington 4 
 
Kingfisher Hennessey 3 
Cleveland Little Axe 5 
 
Kingfisher Kingfisher 3 
Cleveland Moore 8 
 
Kingfisher Lomega 3 
Cleveland Noble 3 
 
Kingfisher Okarche 4 
Cleveland Norman 10 
 
Lincoln Agra 5 
Cleveland Robin Hill 1 
 
Lincoln Carney 4 
Creek Allen-Bowden 4 
 
Lincoln Chandler 3 
Creek Bristow 3 
 
Lincoln Davenport 4 
Creek Depew 3 
 
Lincoln Meeker 4 
Creek Drumright 5 
 
Lincoln Prague 5 
Creek Gypsy 3 
 
Lincoln Stroud 3 
Creek Kellyville 4 
 
Lincoln Wellston 3 
Creek Kiefer 7 
 
Lincoln White Rock 1 
Creek Lone Star 6 
 
Logan Coyle 3 
Creek Mannford 6 
 
Logan Crescent 2 
Creek Mounds 6 
 
Logan Guthrie 7 
Creek Oilton 3 
 
Logan Mulhall-Orlando 4 
Creek Olive 2 
 
McClain Blanchard 5 
Creek Pretty Water 6 
 
McClain Byars 3 
Creek Sapulpa 8 
 
McClain Dibble 4 
Grady Alex 4 
 
McClain Newcastle 7 
Grady Amber-Pocasset 5 
 
McClain Purcell 3 
Grady Bridge Creek 6 
 
McClain Washington 2 
Grady Chickasha 7 
 
McClain Wayne 2 
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Table 2.2 continued 
 
County District 
Number 
of bond 
elections 
 
County District 
Number 
of bond 
elections 
 
Oklahoma 
 
Bethany 
 
5  
 
Payne 
 
Ripley 
 
2 
Oklahoma 
Choctaw/Nicoma 
Park 
9 
 
Payne Stillwater 5 
Oklahoma Crooked Oak 7 
 
Payne Yale 2 
Oklahoma Crutcho 3 
 
Pottawatomie Asher 2 
Oklahoma Deer Creek 5 
 
Pottawatomie Bethel 3 
Oklahoma Edmond 12 
 
Pottawatomie Dale 2 
Oklahoma Harrah 6 
 
Pottawatomie Grove 4 
Oklahoma Jones 4 
 
Pottawatomie Macomb 6 
Oklahoma Luther 3 
 
Pottawatomie Maud 3 
Oklahoma Oakdale 8 
 
Pottawatomie Mcloud 2 
Oklahoma Oklahoma City 4 
 
Pottawatomie Pleasant Grove 2 
Oklahoma Putnam City 7 
 
Pottawatomie Shawnee 4 
Oklahoma Western Heights 6 
 
Pottawatomie South Rock Creek 2 
Okmulgee Beggs 4 
 
Pottawatomie Tecumseh 3 
Okmulgee Dewar 1 
 
Pottawatomie Wanette 3 
Okmulgee Henryetta 3 
 
Rogers Catoosa 6 
Okmulgee Morris 2 
 
Rogers Chelsea 3 
Okmulgee Okmulgee 1 
 
Rogers Claremore 6 
Okmulgee Preston 1 
 
Rogers Inola 6 
Okmulgee Schulter 3 
 
Rogers Justus-Tiawah 7 
Okmulgee Twin Hills 1 
 
Rogers Oologah-Talala 4 
Okmulgee Wilson 5 
 
Rogers Sequoyah 3 
Osage Anderson 2 
 
Rogers Verdigris 2 
Osage Avant 1 
 
Tulsa Berryhill 4 
Osage Barnsdall 2 
 
Tulsa Bixby 7 
Osage Bowring 2 
 
Tulsa Broken Arrow 9 
Osage Hominy 2 
 
Tulsa Collinsville 5 
Osage Mccord 2 
 
Tulsa Glenpool 6 
Osage Osage Hills 4 
 
Tulsa Jenks 13 
Osage Pawhuska 6 
 
Tulsa Keystone 4 
Osage Prue 6 
 
Tulsa Liberty 5 
Osage Shidler 5 
 
Tulsa Owasso 10 
Osage Woodland 3 
 
Tulsa Sand Springs 5 
Osage Wynona 3 
 
Tulsa Skiatook 4 
Pawnee Cleveland 3 
 
Tulsa Sperry 5 
Pawnee Jennings 2 
 
Tulsa Tulsa 4 
Pawnee Pawnee 3 
 
Tulsa Union 11 
Payne Cushing 6 
 
Wagoner Coweta 5 
Payne Glencoe 4 
 
Wagoner Okay 3 
Payne Oak Grove 2 
 
Wagoner Porter Consolidated 5 
Payne Perkins-Tryon 2 
 
Wagoner Wagoner 3 
 
Source: Rogers and Burge, and Stephen H. McDonald and Associates 
41 
 
 
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 S
o
u
rc
e 
(1
9
9
7
-2
0
0
9
) 
A
D
M
 s
ta
n
d
s 
fo
r 
av
er
ag
e 
d
ai
ly
 m
em
b
er
sh
ip
 (
h
er
ea
ft
er
 A
D
M
).
 I
t’
s 
a 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
o
f 
en
ro
ll
m
en
t.
 I
f 
a 
st
u
d
en
t’
s 
n
am
e 
is
 o
n
 t
h
e 
cu
rr
en
t 
ro
ll
 o
f 
a 
cl
as
s,
 t
h
e 
st
u
d
en
t 
is
 s
ai
d
 t
o
 b
e 
in
 m
em
b
er
sh
ip
. 
S
u
m
m
in
g
 t
h
e 
to
ta
l 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
d
ay
s 
in
 m
em
b
er
sh
ip
 o
v
er
 a
ll
 s
tu
d
en
ts
 i
n
 a
 t
er
m
 a
n
d
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y
 t
h
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
d
ay
s 
in
 t
h
at
 t
er
m
 i
s 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
d
ai
ly
 
m
em
b
er
sh
ip
. 
T
h
e 
fi
n
al
 A
D
M
 i
s 
av
er
ag
ed
 o
v
er
 t
w
o
 t
er
m
s 
in
 a
 s
ch
o
o
l 
y
ea
r.
 
F
ra
ct
io
n
. 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 O
k
la
h
o
m
a 
O
ff
ic
e 
o
f 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
. 
F
ra
ct
io
n
. 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 O
k
la
h
o
m
a 
O
ff
ic
e 
o
f 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
. 
F
ra
ct
io
n
. 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 O
k
la
h
o
m
a 
O
ff
ic
e 
o
f 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
. 
F
ra
ct
io
n
. 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 O
k
la
h
o
m
a 
O
ff
ic
e 
o
f 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
. 
F
ra
ct
io
n
. 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 O
k
la
h
o
m
a 
O
ff
ic
e 
o
f 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
. 
M
ea
su
re
d
 i
n
 t
h
o
u
sa
n
d
. 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 O
k
la
h
o
m
a 
O
ff
ic
e 
o
f 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
. 
M
ea
su
re
d
 i
n
 1
0
0
,0
0
0
. 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 O
k
la
h
o
m
a 
O
ff
ic
e 
o
f 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
. 
F
ra
ct
io
n
, 
ch
an
g
es
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
p
re
v
io
u
s 
sc
h
o
o
l 
y
ea
r.
 S
o
u
rc
e:
 O
k
la
h
o
m
a 
O
ff
ic
e 
o
f 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
. 
S
tu
d
en
ts
 p
er
 s
q
u
ar
e 
m
il
es
 i
n
 a
 d
is
tr
ic
t,
 m
ea
su
re
d
 i
n
 t
h
o
u
sa
n
d
. 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 O
k
la
h
o
m
a 
O
ff
ic
e 
o
f 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
. 
S
tu
d
en
ts
 p
er
 f
u
ll
 t
im
e 
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t 
te
ac
h
er
. 
M
ea
su
re
d
 i
n
 1
0
0
. 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 O
k
la
h
o
m
a 
O
ff
ic
e 
o
f 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
. 
M
ea
su
re
d
 i
n
 1
0
,0
0
0
. 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 O
k
la
h
o
m
a 
O
ff
ic
e 
o
f 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
. 
A
 d
u
m
m
y
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 s
ch
o
o
l 
d
is
tr
ic
ts
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
h
ig
h
 s
ch
o
o
ls
. 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 O
k
la
h
o
m
a 
O
ff
ic
e 
o
f 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
. 
D
u
m
m
ie
s.
 S
o
u
rc
e:
 N
at
io
n
al
 C
en
te
r 
fo
r 
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 S
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
(N
C
E
S
),
 U
.S
. 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t 
o
f 
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 O
k
la
h
o
m
a 
M
es
o
n
et
 (
h
tt
p
:/
/w
w
w
.m
es
o
n
et
.o
rg
) 
E
x
p
la
n
at
o
ry
 V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
A
D
M
 (
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
p
u
p
il
s)
 
B
la
ck
 
H
is
p
an
ic
 
N
at
iv
e 
A
m
er
ic
an
 
B
el
o
w
 p
o
v
er
ty
 l
ev
el
 
C
o
ll
eg
e 
o
r 
ab
o
v
e 
D
eb
t 
p
er
 p
u
p
il
 
P
ro
p
er
ty
 v
al
u
e 
p
er
 p
u
p
il
 
E
n
ro
ll
m
en
t 
g
ro
w
th
 
S
tu
d
en
t 
d
en
si
ty
 
P
u
p
il
-t
ea
ch
er
 r
at
io
 
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
N
o
 h
ig
h
 s
ch
o
o
l 
L
o
ca
le
  
W
ea
th
er
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
T
ab
le
 2
.3
 c
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
 
F
ra
ct
io
n
, 
co
n
st
ru
ct
ed
 a
s 
to
ta
l 
v
o
te
s/
v
o
ti
n
g
 a
g
e 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
. 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 R
o
g
er
s 
an
d
 B
u
rg
e 
(2
0
1
0
),
 S
te
p
h
en
 H
. 
M
cD
o
n
al
d
 a
n
d
 
A
ss
o
ci
at
es
. 
F
ra
ct
io
n
, 
tu
rn
o
u
t 
in
 t
h
e 
la
st
 s
ch
o
o
l 
b
o
n
d
 e
le
ct
io
n
. 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 R
o
g
er
s 
an
d
 B
u
rg
e 
(2
0
1
0
),
 S
te
p
h
en
 H
. 
M
cD
o
n
al
d
 a
n
d
 
A
ss
o
ci
at
es
. 
F
ra
ct
io
n
, 
tu
rn
o
u
t 
in
 t
h
e 
sc
h
o
o
l 
b
o
n
d
 e
le
ct
io
n
 b
ef
o
re
 t
h
e 
p
re
v
io
u
s 
o
n
e.
 S
o
u
rc
e:
 R
o
g
er
s 
an
d
 B
u
rg
e 
(2
0
1
0
),
 S
te
p
h
en
 H
. 
M
cD
o
n
al
d
 a
n
d
 A
ss
o
ci
at
es
. 
Y
ea
rs
 p
as
se
d
 s
in
ce
 l
as
t 
el
ec
ti
o
n
. 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 R
o
g
er
s 
an
d
 B
u
rg
e 
(2
0
1
0
),
 S
te
p
h
en
 H
. 
M
cD
o
n
al
d
 a
n
d
 A
ss
o
ci
at
es
. 
M
ea
su
re
d
 i
n
 1
0
,0
0
0
. 
C
o
m
p
u
te
d
 a
s 
to
ta
l 
am
o
u
n
t/
A
D
M
. 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 R
o
g
er
s 
an
d
 B
u
rg
e,
 S
te
p
h
en
 H
. 
M
cD
o
n
al
d
 a
n
d
 
A
ss
o
ci
at
es
, 
O
ff
ic
e 
o
f 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
. 
  
 F
ra
ct
io
n
, 
co
n
st
ru
ct
ed
 a
s 
y
es
 v
o
te
s/
to
ta
l 
v
o
te
s.
 S
o
u
rc
e:
 R
o
g
er
s 
an
d
 B
u
rg
e 
(2
0
1
0
),
 a
n
d
 S
te
p
h
en
 H
. 
M
cD
o
n
al
d
 a
n
d
 
A
ss
o
ci
at
es
. 
N
o
te
: 
A
ll
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
ar
e 
m
ea
su
re
d
 a
t 
th
e 
sc
h
o
o
l 
d
is
tr
ic
t 
le
v
el
. 
T
o
 i
n
te
rp
re
t 
re
g
re
ss
io
n
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 e
as
il
y
, 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
ar
e 
m
ea
su
re
d
 i
n
 1
0
0
, 
1
,0
0
0
, 
1
0
,0
0
0
, 
an
d
 1
0
0
,0
0
0
, 
so
 t
h
e 
m
ea
n
s 
o
f 
th
e 
ex
p
la
n
at
o
ry
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
an
d
 t
h
e 
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
ar
e 
o
n
 t
h
e 
sa
m
e 
sc
al
e 
(b
et
w
ee
n
 0
 a
n
d
 1
).
 
V
o
te
r 
tu
rn
o
u
t 
L
ag
 1
 
L
ag
 2
 
Y
ea
rs
 
B
o
n
d
 v
al
u
e 
p
er
 p
u
p
il
 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
V
ar
ia
b
le
 
A
p
p
ro
v
al
 s
h
ar
e 
 
 
 
43 
 
Table 2.4: Summary statistics of variables (1997-2009)  
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
     Panel A: School district characteristics  
   
 
    Black  0.0531 0.1029 0 0.9880 
Hispanic  0.0390 0.0513 0 0.5103 
Native American  0.1809 0.1348 0 0.7115 
Below poverty level 0.1218 0.0575 0.0172 0.3485 
College degree or above 0.1994 0.1171 0.0308 0.5906 
Debt service per pupil 0.3940 0.3688 0 2.3741 
Property value per pupil 0.2704 0.1700 0.0649 1.2737 
Enrollment growth 0.0086 0.0431 -0.2475 0.1967 
Student density 0.6861 1.4195 0.0028 14.8275 
Pupil-teacher ratio 0.1710 0.0215 0.0868 0.2230 
Population  0.2010 0.3952 0.0041 2.9848 
No high School 0.1200 0.3252 0 1 
     Panel B: Bond attributes 
     
    Turnout rate 0.1408 0.0977 0.0062 0.8339 
Lag 1  0.1490 0.1015 0.0071 0.8339 
Lag 2 0.1507 0.1014 0.0197 0.8339 
Approval share 0.7149 0.1143 0.2145 0.9726 
Years 2.7232 1.9559 0 10 
Bond value per pupil 0.2251 0.3230 0.0028 3.1722 
     Panel C: Locale dummies  Number of school districts in each locale category 
 
    City 
   
6 
Suburb  
   
16 
Town fringe 
   
9 
Town distant 
   
11 
Rural fringe 
   
34 
Rural distant 
   
59 
Rural remote 
   
10 
 
  Total number of observations                                                                                          662           
 
 Source: Office of Accountability, National Center for Education Statistics 
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Table 2.5 Oklahoma school district types 
District County District Type 
 
Allen-Bowden Creek Elementary 
Anderson Osage Elementary 
Avant Osage Elementary 
Banner Canadian Elementary 
Bowring Osage Elementary 
Byars Mcclain Elementary 
Crutcho Oklahoma Elementary 
Friend Grady Elementary 
Grove Pottawatomie Elementary 
Gypsy Creek Elementary 
Jennings Pawnee Elementary 
Justus-Tiawah Rogers Elementary 
Keystone Tulsa Elementary 
Lone Star Creek Elementary 
Maple Canadian Elementary 
Mccord Osage Elementary 
Middleberg Grady Elementary 
Oak Grove Payne Elementary 
Oakdale Oklahoma Elementary 
Osage Hills Osage Elementary 
Pioneer Grady Elementary 
Pleasant Grove Pottawatomie Elementary 
Pretty Water Creek Elementary 
Riverside Canadian Elementary 
Robin Hill Cleveland Elementary 
South Rock Creek Pottawatomie Elementary 
Twin Hills Okmulgee Elementary 
Verdigris Rogers Elementary 
White Rock Lincoln Elementary 
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Table 2.5 continued 
District County District Type 
 
Agra Lincoln Unified 
Alex Grady Unified 
Amber-Pocasset Grady Unified 
Asher Pottawatomie Unified 
Barnsdall Osage Unified 
Beggs Okmulgee Unified 
Berryhill Tulsa Unified 
Bethany Oklahoma Unified 
Bethel Pottawatomie Unified 
Bixby Tulsa Unified 
Blanchard Mcclain Unified 
Bridge Creek Grady Unified 
Bristow Creek Unified 
Broken Arrow Tulsa Unified 
Calumet Canadian Unified 
Carney Lincoln Unified 
Cashion Kingfisher Unified 
Catoosa Rogers Unified 
Chandler Lincoln Unified 
Chelsea Rogers Unified 
Chickasha Grady Unified 
Choctaw/Nicoma Park Oklahoma Unified 
Claremore Rogers Unified 
Cleveland Pawnee Unified 
Collinsville Tulsa Unified 
Coweta Wagoner Unified 
Coyle Logan Unified 
Crescent Logan Unified 
Crooked Oak Oklahoma Unified 
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Table 2.5 continued 
District County District Type 
 
Cushing Payne Unified 
Dale Pottawatomie Unified 
Davenport Lincoln Unified 
Deer Creek Oklahoma Unified 
Depew Creek Unified 
Dewar Okmulgee Unified 
Dibble Mcclain Unified 
Dover Kingfisher Unified 
Drumright Creek Unified 
Edmond Oklahoma Unified 
El Reno Canadian Unified 
Glencoe Payne Unified 
Glenpool Tulsa Unified 
Guthrie Logan Unified 
Harrah Oklahoma Unified 
Hennessey Kingfisher Unified 
Henryetta Okmulgee Unified 
Hominy Osage Unified 
Inola Rogers Unified 
Jenks Tulsa Unified 
Jones Oklahoma Unified 
Kellyville Creek Unified 
Kiefer Creek Unified 
Kingfisher Kingfisher Unified 
Lexington Cleveland Unified 
Liberty Tulsa Unified 
Little Axe Cleveland Unified 
Lomega Kingfisher Unified 
Luther Oklahoma Unified 
Macomb Pottawatomie Unified 
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Table 2.5 continued 
District County District Type 
 
Mannford Creek Unified 
Maud Pottawatomie Unified 
Mcloud Pottawatomie Unified 
Meeker Lincoln Unified 
Midwest City-Del City Oklahoma Unified 
Millwood Oklahoma Unified 
Minco Grady Unified 
Moore Cleveland Unified 
Morris Okmulgee Unified 
Mounds Creek Unified 
Mulhall-Orlando Logan Unified 
Mustang Canadian Unified 
Newcastle Mcclain Unified 
Ninnekah Grady Unified 
Noble Cleveland Unified 
Norman Cleveland Unified 
Oilton Creek Unified 
Okarche Kingfisher Unified 
Okay Wagoner Unified 
Oklahoma City Oklahoma Unified 
Okmulgee Okmulgee Unified 
Olive Creek Unified 
Oologah-Talala Rogers Unified 
Owasso Tulsa Unified 
Pawhuska Osage Unified 
Pawnee Pawnee Unified 
Perkins-Tryon Payne Unified 
Piedmont Canadian Unified 
Porter Consolidated Wagoner Unified 
Prague Lincoln Unified 
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Table 2.5 continued 
District County District Type    
 
Okmulgee Unified    Preston 
Prue Osage Unified    
Purcell Mcclain Unified    
Putnam City Oklahoma Unified    
Ripley Payne Unified    
Rush Springs Grady Unified    
Sand Springs Tulsa Unified    
Sapulpa Creek Unified    
Schulter Okmulgee Unified    
Sequoyah Rogers Unified    
Shawnee Pottawatomie Unified    
Shidler Osage Unified    
Skiatook Tulsa Unified    
Sperry Tulsa Unified    
Stillwater Payne Unified    
Stroud Lincoln Unified    
Tecumseh Pottawatomie Unified 
   Tulsa Tulsa Unified 
Tuttle Grady Unified 
Union Tulsa Unified 
Union City Canadian Unified 
Verden Grady Unified 
Wagoner Wagoner Unified 
Wanette Pottawatomie Unified 
Washington Mcclain Unified 
Wayne Mcclain Unified 
Wellston Lincoln Unified 
Western Heights Oklahoma Unified 
Wilson Okmulgee Unified 
Woodland Osage Unified 
Wynona Osage Unified 
Yale Payne Unified 
Yukon Canadian Unified 
 
Source: American Community Survey, US Census Bureau, available at http://factfinder2.census.gov/ 
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Table 2.6: Mesonet station(s) for school districts in Oklahoma (17 counties) 
County District Station(s) 
 
Canadian Banner El Reno 
Canadian Calumet El Reno 
Canadian El Reno El Reno 
Canadian Maple El Reno 
Canadian Mustang Minco 
Canadian Piedmont El Reno 
Canadian Riverside El Reno 
Canadian Union City Minco 
Canadian Yukon El Reno 
Cleveland Lexington Washington, Byars 
Cleveland Little Axe Norman 
Cleveland Moore Norman 
Cleveland Noble Norman 
Cleveland Norman Norman 
Cleveland Robin Hill Norman 
Creek Allen-Bowden Bixby 
Creek Bristow Bristow 
Creek Depew Bristow, Oilton 
Creek Drumright Oilton 
Creek Gypsy Bristow 
Creek Kellyville Bristow 
Creek Kiefer Hectorville 
Creek Lone Star Bixby 
Creek Mannford Oilton 
Creek Mounds Hectorville 
Creek Oilton Oilton 
Creek Olive Oilton 
Creek Pretty Water Hectorville 
Creek Sapulpa Bixby 
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Table 2.6: continued 
County District Station(s) 
 
Grady Alex Ninnekah, Chickasha 
Grady Amber-Pocasset Chickasha, Minco 
Grady Bridge Creek Minco, Norman 
Grady Chickasha Chickasha 
Grady Friend Chickasha 
Grady Middleberg Norman 
Grady Minco Minco 
Grady Ninnekah Ninnekah 
Grady Pioneer Chickasha 
Grady Rush Springs Acme 
Grady Tuttle Minco 
Grady Verden Chickasha, Minco 
Kingfisher Cashion Kingfisher, Guthrie 
Kingfisher Dover Kingfisher 
Kingfisher Hennessey Kingfisher, Marshall 
Kingfisher Kingfisher Kingfisher 
Kingfisher Lomega Kingfisher 
Kingfisher Okarche Kingfisher, El Reno 
Lincoln Agra Perkins, Chandler 
Lincoln Carney Perkins, Chandler 
Lincoln Chandler Chandler 
Lincoln Davenport Chandler 
Lincoln Meeker Chandler, Shawnee 
Lincoln Prague Chandler, Shawnee 
Lincoln Stroud Chandler 
Lincoln Wellston Chandler 
Lincoln White Rock Shawnee 
Logan Coyle Marena 
Logan Crescent Guthrie, Marshall 
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Table 2.6: continued 
County District Station(s) 
 
Logan Guthrie Guthrie 
Logan Mulhall-Orlando Marshall, Blackwell 
Mcclain Blanchard Norman 
Mcclain Byars Byars 
Mcclain Dibble Washington 
Mcclain Newcastle Norman 
Mcclain Purcell Washington 
Mcclain Washington Washington 
Mcclain Wayne Washington 
Oklahoma Bethany Oklahoma City West 
Oklahoma Choctaw/Nicoma Park Spencer 
Oklahoma Crooked Oak Spencer 
Oklahoma Crutcho Oklahoma City East 
Oklahoma Deer Creek Oklahoma City North 
Oklahoma Edmond Oklahoma City North 
Oklahoma Harrah Spencer 
Oklahoma Jones Spencer 
Oklahoma Luther Spencer 
Oklahoma Midwest City-Del City Oklahoma City East 
Oklahoma Millwood Oklahoma City North 
Oklahoma Oakdale Oklahoma City North 
Oklahoma Oklahoma City Spencer 
Oklahoma Putnam City Spencer 
Oklahoma Western Heights Norman 
Okmulgee Beggs Hectorville 
Okmulgee Dewar Okmulgee 
Okmulgee Henryetta Okmulgee 
Okmulgee Morris Okmulgee 
Okmulgee Okmulgee Okmulgee 
Okmulgee Preston Okmulgee, Hectorville 
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Table 2.6: continued 
County District Station(s) 
 
Okmulgee Schulter Okmulgee 
Okmulgee Twin Hills Okmulgee 
Okmulgee Wilson Okmulgee 
Osage Anderson Bixby, Oilton 
Osage Avant Skiatook 
Osage Barnsdall Wynona 
Osage Bowring Foraker 
Osage Hominy Wynona, Blackwell 
Osage Mccord Burbank, Wynona 
Osage Osage Hills Copan, Wynona 
Osage Pawhuska Foraker, Skiatook 
Osage Prue Wynona, Foraker 
Osage Shidler Newkirk 
Osage Woodland Burbank 
Osage Wynona Wynona, Oilton 
Pawnee Cleveland Pawnee 
Pawnee Jennings Oilton 
Pawnee Pawnee Pawnee, Perkins 
Payne Cushing Oilton, Pawnee 
Payne Glencoe Stillwater 
Payne Oak Grove Oilton 
Payne Perkins-Tryon Perkins 
Payne Ripley Perkins 
Payne Stillwater Stillwater, Pawnee 
Payne Yale Oilton 
Pottawatomie Asher Byars 
Pottawatomie Bethel Shawnee 
Pottawatomie Dale Shawnee 
Pottawatomie Grove Shawnee 
Pottawatomie Macomb Shawnee 
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Table 2.6 continued 
County District Station(s) 
 
Pottawatomie Maud Bowlegs 
Pottawatomie Mcloud Shawnee 
Pottawatomie Pleasant Grove Bowlegs 
Pottawatomie Shawnee Shawnee 
Pottawatomie South Rock Creek Shawnee 
Pottawatomie Tecumseh Shawnee 
Pottawatomie Wanette Byars 
Rogers Catoosa Claremore 
Rogers Chelsea Claremore, Nowata 
Rogers Claremore Claremore 
Rogers Inola Inola 
Rogers Justus-Tiawah Claremore 
Rogers Oologah-Talala Claremore 
Rogers Sequoyah Claremore 
Rogers Verdigris Claremore 
Tulsa Berryhill Bixby 
Tulsa Bixby Bixby 
County District Station(s) 
Tulsa Broken Arrow Bixby 
Tulsa Collinsville Skiatook 
Tulsa Glenpool Bixby 
Tulsa Jenks Bixby 
Tulsa Keystone Oilton 
Tulsa Liberty Hectorville 
Tulsa Owasso Claremore 
Tulsa Sand Springs Bixby, Oilton 
Tulsa Skiatook Skiatook 
Tulsa Sperry Skiatook 
Tulsa Tulsa Bixby, Skiatook 
Tulsa Union Bixby 
Wagoner Coweta Porter 
Wagoner Okay Porter 
Wagoner Porter Consolidated Porter 
Wagoner Wagoner Porter 
 
Source: Oklahoma Mesonet, available at www.mesonet.org 
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Table 2.7: Weather variables (1997-2009)  
 
Weather Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
 
    
Temp. Dev. from monthly average (F) 5.9552 4.9049 0.0016 22.2323 
Temp. Dev. from normal average of the date (F) 0.4940 2.7354 0 25.4604 
Extreme weather circumstance dummy  0.0608 0.2392 0 1 
Month dummy (m=1, 8, 9, 11) 0.2272 0.4194 0 1 
Rain 0.0777 0.2978         0 3.4000 
 
N 
   
662 
 
Source: Oklahoma Mesonet 
Note: F denotes Fahrenheit 
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  Table 2.8: Verification of the IV approach: a Hausman test (Sample 1) 
 
 
                         Approval Share 
 
Variables 
Lag 1  
Column (1)    
Lag 2 
Column (2) 
 
Residual -0.3236 
 
-0.29 
 
(0.0989)*** 
 
(0.1376)*** 
Turnout  -0.007 
 
0.004 
 
(0.1043) 
 
(0.1311) 
Density 0.0094 
 
0.008 
 
(0.0026)*** 
 
(0.0028)*** 
Years  0.0145 
 
0.0161 
 
(0.0029)*** 
 
(0.0032)*** 
Enrollment growth 0.3438 
 
0.3814 
 
(0.115)*** 
 
(0.1198)*** 
Bond value per pupil -0.0738 
 
-0.0741 
 
(0.0174)*** 
 
(0.018)*** 
Debt per pupil 0.0476 
 
0.0423 
 
(0.0185)** 
 
(0.0175)** 
No high school -0.0445 
 
-0.041 
 
(0.0206)** 
 
(0.0235)* 
City 0.6172 
 
0.6358 
 
(0.0289)*** 
 
(0.0297)*** 
Suburb 0.6538 
 
0.6655 
 
(0.0221)*** 
 
(0.0256)*** 
Town fringe 0.643 
 
0.6582 
 
(0.0361)*** 
 
(0.0334)*** 
Town distant 0.6643 
 
0.6679 
 
(0.0237)*** 
 
(0.0263)*** 
Rural fringe 0.687 
 
0.6958 
 
(0.0286)*** 
 
(0.0302)*** 
Rural distant 0.6287 
 
0.6371 
 
(0.0297)*** 
 
(0.0353)*** 
Rural remote 0.5979 
 
0.597 
 
(0.04)*** 
 
(0.0445)*** 
    N 625 
 
561 
R2 0.2212 
 
0.2367 
 
The unit of observation is a consolidated bond election held in a school district in a year. The 
sample only includes capital bonds. Under column (2), sample size reduces because lag 2 (voter 
turnout) is not available for all observations (64/625). Estimates are reported with robust clustered 
errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
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   Table 2.9: First stage results (Sample 1) 
 
 
Turnout 
 
 
Lag 1   Lag 2 
Variables Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
 
Lag turnout 0.4872 
 
0.354 
 
(0.0535)*** 
 
(0.0381)*** 
Month dummy 0.0223 
 
0.0248 
 
(0.0088)** 
 
(0.008)*** 
Density 0.0009 
 
0.0005 
 
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0015) 
Years  -0.0094 
 
-0.0082 
 
(0.0021)*** 
 
(0.0027)*** 
Enrollment growth -0.0068 
 
-0.0167 
 
(0.0592) 
 
(0.0803) 
Bond value per pupil 0.0818 
 
0.0751 
 
(0.0143)*** 
 
(0.0165)*** 
Debt per pupil -0.0247 
 
-0.0255 
 
(0.0103)** 
 
(0.0111)** 
No high school 0.0134 
 
0.014 
 
(0.0126) 
 
(0.0142) 
City 0.0335 
 
0.0098 
 
(0.0199)* 
 
(0.0229) 
Suburb 0.0506 
 
0.028 
 
(0.0158)*** 
 
(0.0169)* 
Town fringe 0.0646 
 
0.0429 
 
(0.0176)*** 
 
(0.0171)** 
Town distant 0.0642 
 
0.0331 
 
(0.0181)*** 
 
(0.0188)* 
Rural fringe 0.0605 
 
0.0416 
 
(0.0152)*** 
 
(0.0152)*** 
Rural distant 0.1027 
 
0.0884 
 
(0.0203)*** 
 
(0.0199)*** 
Rural remote 0.1229 
 
0.1094 
 
(0.0227)*** 
 
(0.0288)*** 
 
N 625 
 
561 
R2 0.55 
 
0.4708 
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Table 2.9 continued 
 
 
Turnout 
 
 
Lag 1   Lag 2 
Variables Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
 
Test Statistics    
    
Under identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat) 21.011*** 
 
18.216*** 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat) 63.593*** 
 
45.608*** 
Over identification test (Hansen J statistic) 0.067 
 
0.269 
 
The unit of observation is voter turnout in a school bond election. The sample only includes 
consolidated capital bonds. Under column (2), sample size reduces because lag 2 (voter turnout) is 
not available for all observations (64/625). Estimates are reported with robust clustered errors in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
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Table 2.10: IV results (Sample 1) 
 
 
Approval share 
 
 
  OLS 
 
IV 
   
 
Lag1 
 
Lag2 
Variables Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
 
Column (3) 
 
Turnout  -0.2319 
 
-0.007 
 
0.004 
 
(0.0599)*** 
 
(0.1065) 
 
(0.1243) 
Density 0.0092 
 
0.0094 
 
0.008 
 
(0.0027)*** 
 
(0.0027)*** 
 
(0.0028)*** 
Years  0.0128 
 
0.0145 
 
0.0161 
 
(0.0027)*** 
 
(0.0028)*** 
 
(0.0033)*** 
Enrollment growth 0.3489 
 
0.3438 
 
0.3814 
 
(0.1167)*** 
 
(0.112)*** 
 
(0.115)*** 
Bond value per pupil -0.0546 
 
-0.0738 
 
-0.0741 
 
(0.0158)*** 
 
(0.0175)*** 
 
(0.0184)*** 
Debt per pupil 0.0405 
 
0.0476 
 
0.0423 
 
(0.0182)** 
 
(0.0182)*** 
 
(0.0174)** 
No high school -0.0368 
 
-0.0445 
 
-0.0410 
 
(0.0202)* 
 
(0.0209)** 
 
(0.0233)* 
City 0.6378 
 
0.6172 
 
0.702 
 
(0.0282)*** 
 
(0.0303)*** 
 
(0.0359)*** 
Suburb 0.679 
 
0.6538 
 
0.7317 
 
(0.0209)*** 
 
(0.0221)*** 
 
(0.0276)*** 
Town fringe 0.6754 
 
0.643 
 
0.7244 
 
(0.0347)*** 
 
(0.0366)*** 
 
(0.0393)*** 
Town distant 0.697 
 
0.6643 
 
0.7341 
 
(0.0199)*** 
 
(0.0247)*** 
 
(0.0297)*** 
Rural fringe 0.7184 
 
0.687 
 
0.762 
 
(0.025)*** 
 
(0.0287)*** 
 
(0.0315)*** 
Rural distant 0.6772 
 
0.6287 
 
0.7033 
 
(0.0235)*** 
 
(0.0302)*** 
 
(0.0349)*** 
Rural remote 0.6521 
 
0.5979 
 
0.6632 
 
(0.0333)*** 
 
(0.0409)*** 
 
(0.0425)*** 
      
      N 625 
 
625 
 
561 
R2 0.21 
 
0.19 
 
0.2035 
 
The unit of observation is a consolidated bond election held in a school district in a year. The 
sample only includes capital bonds. Under column (2), sample size reduces because lag 2 (voter 
turnout) is not available for all observations (64/625). Estimates are reported with robust clustered 
errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
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Table 2.11: Verification of the IV approach: a Hausman test (Sample 2) 
 
 
                              Approval Share 
 
 
Lag 1   Lag 2 
Variables Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
 
Residual -0.2298 
 
-0.2691 
 
(0.1029)** 
 
(0.1348)** 
Turnout -0.0851 
 
-0.0191 
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.1336) 
Density 0.0081 
 
0.0067 
 
(0.0033)** 
 
(0.0033)** 
Years  0.0143 
 
0.0168 
 
(0.0031)*** 
 
(0.0033)*** 
Enrollment growth 0.3579 
 
0.3854 
 
(0.1073)*** 
 
(0.1098)*** 
Bond value per pupil -0.0797 
 
-0.0795 
 
(0.0193)*** 
 
(0.0185)*** 
Debt per pupil 0.0479 
 
0.0429 
 
(0.0188)** 
 
(0.0173)** 
No high school -0.0301 
 
-0.0321 
 
(0.0227) 
 
(0.0228) 
City 0.6401 
 
0.6523 
 
(0.0303)*** 
 
(0.0305)*** 
Suburb 0.6716 
 
0.6756 
 
(0.022)*** 
 
(0.025)*** 
Town fringe 0.6671 
 
0.6716 
 
(0.0354)*** 
 
(0.0326)*** 
Town distant 0.6843 
 
0.676 
 
(0.0236)*** 
 
(0.0258)*** 
Rural fringe 0.7036 
 
0.7041 
 
(0.0282)*** 
 
(0.0292)*** 
Rural distant 0.6584 
 
0.6493 
 
(0.0301)*** 
 
(0.0353)*** 
Rural remote 0.6376 
 
0.6245 
 
(0.0392)*** 
 
(0.0421)*** 
    N 662 
 
603 
R2 0.2055 
 
0.2271 
 
The unit of observation is a consolidated bond election held in a school district in a year. The 
sample includes both capital and transportation bonds. Under column (2), sample size reduces 
because lag 2 (voter turnout) is not available for all observations (59/662). Estimates are reported 
with robust clustered errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% 
levels. 
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Table 2.12: First stage results (Sample 2) 
 
 
Turnout 
 
 
Lag 1   Lag 2 
Variables Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
 
Lag turnout 0.4617 
 
0.3506 
 
(0.0482)*** 
 
(0.0432)*** 
Month dummy 0.0234 
 
0.0252 
 
(0.0087)*** 
 
(0.0078)*** 
Density 0.0009 
 
0.0006 
 
(0.0012) 
 
(0.0016) 
Years  -0.0088 
 
-0.0082 
 
(0.002)*** 
 
(0.0025)*** 
Enrollment growth -0.0426 
 
-0.018 
 
(0.0541) 
 
(0.0755) 
Bond value per pupil 0.0829 
 
0.079 
 
(0.0147)*** 
 
(0.0167)*** 
Debt per pupil -0.0211 
 
-0.0245 
 
(0.0098)** 
 
(0.0103)** 
No high school 0.0103 
 
0.0167 
 
(0.0119) 
 
(0.0142) 
City 0.0352 
 
0.0423 
 
(0.0191)* 
 
(0.0221)* 
Suburb 0.0545 
 
0.063 
 
(0.0143)*** 
 
(0.0167)*** 
Town fringe 0.0691 
 
0.0774 
 
(0.0157)*** 
 
(0.0177)*** 
Town distant 0.0683 
 
0.0715 
 
(0.0164)*** 
 
(0.0196)*** 
Rural fringe 0.0655 
 
0.0769 
 
(0.0133)*** 
 
(0.0166)*** 
Rural distant 0.1074 
 
0.1218 
 
(0.0174)*** 
 
(0.0221)*** 
Rural remote 0.1314 
 
0.1454 
 
(0.0238)*** 
 
(0.0283)*** 
    N 662 
 
603 
R2 0.52 
 
0.4642 
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Table 2.12 continued 
 
 
Turnout 
 
 
Lag 1   Lag 2 
Variables Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
 
 
Test Statistics 
 
Under identification test(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat) 24.209*** 
 
20.092*** 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat) 91.346*** 
 
41.169*** 
Over identification test (Hansen J statistic) 0.046 
 
0.022 
 
The unit of observation is voter turnout in a school bond election. The sample includes 
consolidated capital and transportation bonds. Under column (2), sample size reduces because lag 
2 (voter turnout) is not available for all observations (59/662). Estimates are reported with robust 
clustered errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
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Table 2.13: IV results (Sample 2) 
 
 
Approval share 
 
 
OLS 
 
IV 
  
  
 
Lag1 
 
Lag2 
Variables Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
 
Column (3) 
 
Turnout -0.2517 
 
-0.0851 
 
-0.0211 
 
(0.0582)*** 
 
(0.1068) 
 
(0.1216) 
Density 0.008 
 
0.0081 
 
0.0077 
 
(0.0033)** 
 
(0.0033)** 
 
(0.0035)** 
Years  0.0131 
 
0.0143 
 
0.0172 
 
(0.0029)*** 
 
(0.0031)*** 
 
(0.0031)*** 
Enrollment growth 0.3582 
 
0.3579 
 
0.3428 
 
(0.1056)*** 
 
(0.103)*** 
 
(0.1056)*** 
Bond value per pupil -0.065 
 
-0.0797 
 
-0.0683 
 
(0.0172)*** 
 
(0.0194)*** 
 
(0.0163)*** 
Debt per pupil 0.0433 
 
0.0479 
 
0.0375 
 
(0.0182)** 
 
(0.0184)*** 
 
(0.0156)** 
No high school -0.0254 
 
-0.0301 
 
-0.0439 
 
(0.0214) 
 
(0.0227) 
 
(0.0244)* 
City 0.6541 
 
0.6401 
 
0.6361 
 
(0.0286)*** 
 
(0.0313)*** 
 
(0.0293)*** 
Suburb 0.6895 
 
0.6716 
 
0.667 
 
(0.0202)*** 
 
(0.0218)*** 
 
(0.024)*** 
Town fringe 0.6900 
 
0.6671 
 
0.6687 
 
(0.0326)*** 
 
(0.0354)*** 
 
(0.0291)*** 
Town distant 0.708 
 
0.6843 
 
0.6683 
 
(0.019)*** 
 
(0.024)*** 
 
(0.0273)*** 
Rural fringe 0.7259 
 
0.7036 
 
0.7039 
 
(0.0237)*** 
 
(0.0279)*** 
 
(0.0293)*** 
Rural distant 0.693 
 
0.6584 
 
0.6484 
 
(0.0225)*** 
 
(0.03)*** 
 
(0.0343)*** 
Rural remote 0.6773 
 
0.6376 
 
0.6102 
 
(0.0299)*** 
 
(0.0386)*** 
 
(0.0417)*** 
      
      N 662 
 
662 
 
603 
R2 0.2 
 
0.19 
 
0.2 
 
The unit of observation is a consolidated bond election held in a school district in a year. The 
sample includes both capital and transportation bonds. Under column (2), sample size reduces 
because lag 2 (voter turnout) is not available for all observations (59/662). Estimates are reported 
with robust clustered errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% 
levels. 
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Table 2.14: Verification of the IV approach: a Hausman test (Sample 3) 
 
 
                             Approval Share 
 
  
Lag 1   Lag 2 
Variables Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
 
Residual -0.2372 
 
-0.2621 
 
(0.0947)** 
 
(0.1222)** 
Turnout  -0.0622 
 
-0.0211 
 
(0.1037) 
 
(0.1258) 
Density 0.0086 
 
0.0077 
 
(0.0037)** 
 
(0.0037)** 
Years  0.0141 
 
0.0172 
 
(0.0029)*** 
 
(0.003)*** 
Enrollment growth 0.342 
 
0.3428 
 
(0.1037)*** 
 
(0.1054)*** 
Bond value per pupil -0.0698 
 
-0.0683 
 
(0.0158)*** 
 
(0.0156)*** 
Debt per pupil 0.0406 
 
0.0375 
 
(0.017)** 
 
(0.0157)** 
No high school -0.0456 
 
-0.0439 
 
(0.0231)** 
 
(0.024)* 
City 0.6319 
 
0.6361 
 
(0.0286)*** 
 
(0.0285)*** 
Suburb 0.6668 
 
0.667 
 
(0.0203)*** 
 
(0.0237)*** 
Town fringe 0.6716 
 
0.6687 
 
(0.0298)*** 
 
(0.0291)*** 
Town distant 0.677 
 
0.6683 
 
(0.0246)*** 
 
(0.0262)*** 
Rural fringe 0.7063 
 
0.7039 
 
(0.0281)*** 
 
(0.0287)*** 
Rural distant 0.6574 
 
0.6484 
 
(0.0301)*** 
 
(0.0341)*** 
Rural remote 0.6292 
 
0.6102 
 
(0.0402)*** 
 
(0.0411)*** 
    N 1034 
 
956 
R2 0.208 
 
0.2298 
 
The unit of observation is a bond measure on a ballot. There are multiple measures per ballot. 
The sample includes both capital and transportation bonds. Under column (2), sample size 
reduces because lag 2 (voter turnout) is not available for all observations (78/1034). Estimates 
are reported with robust clustered errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 
5 and 10% levels. 
64 
 
Table 2.15: First stage results (Sample 3) 
 
 
Turnout 
 
 
Lag 1   Lag 2 
Variables Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
 
Lag turnout 0.4295 
 
0.3364 
 
(0.0389)*** 
 
(0.0508)*** 
Month dummy 0.0257 
 
0.0264 
 
(0.0103)** 
 
(0.0089)*** 
Density -0.0019 
 
-0.0018 
 
(0.0021) 
 
(0.0023) 
Years  -0.0081 
 
-0.0073 
 
(0.0018)*** 
 
(0.0022)*** 
Enrollment growth -0.0297 
 
-0.044 
 
(0.0534) 
 
(0.0706) 
Bond value per pupil 0.0637 
 
0.0602 
 
(0.0135)*** 
 
(0.0145)*** 
Debt per pupil -0.0118 
 
-0.0122 
 
(0.0099) 
 
(0.0105) 
No high school 0.0161 
 
0.0206 
 
(0.0122) 
 
(0.0144) 
City 0.0561 
 
0.064 
 
(0.019)*** 
 
(0.0226)*** 
Suburb 0.0684 
 
0.076 
 
(0.0142)*** 
 
(0.0181)*** 
Town fringe 0.0744 
 
0.0822 
 
(0.0141)*** 
 
(0.018)*** 
Town distant 0.0853 
 
0.0884 
 
(0.0163)*** 
 
(0.0217)*** 
Rural fringe 0.0739 
 
0.0859 
 
(0.0144)*** 
 
(0.0196)*** 
Rural distant 0.1174 
 
0.1326 
 
(0.0166)*** 
 
(0.0233)*** 
Rural remote 0.146 
 
0.1575 
 
(0.0286)*** 
 
(0.0338)*** 
    N 1034 
 
956 
R2 0.48 
 
0.4341 
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Table 2.15 continued 
 
 
Turnout 
 
 
Lag 1   Lag 2 
Variables Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
 
Test Statistics 
 
Under identification test(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat) 25.466*** 
 
21.805*** 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat) 101.433*** 
 
30.875*** 
Over identification test (Hansen J statistic) 0.201 
 
0.096 
 
The unit of observation is voter turnout in a school bond election. The sample includes both 
capital and transportation bonds. Under column (2), sample size reduces because lag 2 (voter 
turnout) is not available for all observations (78/1034). Estimates are reported with robust 
clustered errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
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Table 2.16: IV results (Sample 3) 
 
 
Approval Share 
  
 
OLS 
 
IV 
  
  
 
Lag1 
 
Lag2 
Variables Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
 
Column (3) 
 
Turnout  -0.2424 
 
-0.0622 
 
-0.0191 
 
(0.0536)*** 
 
(0.1015) 
 
(0.1279) 
Density 0.0079 
 
0.0086 
 
0.0067 
 
(0.0037)** 
 
(0.0035)** 
 
(0.0034)** 
Years  0.0131 
 
0.0141 
 
0.0168 
 
(0.0027)*** 
 
(0.0028)*** 
 
(0.0034)*** 
Enrollment growth 0.3413 
 
0.342 
 
0.3854 
 
(0.1021)*** 
 
(0.1019)*** 
 
(0.1065)*** 
Bond value per pupil -0.058 
 
-0.0698 
 
-0.0795 
 
(0.0146)*** 
 
(0.0163)*** 
 
(0.0189)*** 
Debt per pupil 0.0378 
 
0.0406 
 
0.0429 
 
(0.0166)** 
 
(0.0166)** 
 
(0.0172)** 
No high school -0.04 
 
-0.0456 
 
-0.0321 
 
(0.0222)* 
 
(0.0235)* 
 
(0.0227 
City 0.6512 
 
0.6319 
 
0.6523 
 
(0.0266)*** 
 
(0.0291)*** 
 
(0.0314)*** 
Suburb 0.6875 
 
0.6668 
 
0.6756 
 
(0.0178)*** 
 
(0.0206)*** 
 
(0.0242)*** 
Town fringe 0.6968 
 
0.6716 
 
0.6716 
 
(0.0281)*** 
 
(0.0298)*** 
 
(0.0319)*** 
Town distant 0.7048 
 
0.677 
 
0.676 
 
(0.0188)*** 
 
(0.025)*** 
 
(0.0259)*** 
Rural fringe 0.7308 
 
0.7063 
 
0.7041 
 
(0.0234)*** 
 
(0.0282)*** 
 
(0.0285)*** 
Rural distant 0.6951 
 
0.6574 
 
0.6493 
 
(0.0217)*** 
 
(0.03)*** 
 
(0.0344)*** 
Rural remote 0.6726 
 
0.6292 
 
0.6245 
 
(0.0303)*** 
 
(0.0395)*** 
 
(0.0416)*** 
      
      N 1034 
 
1034 
 
956 
R2 0.2 
 
0.19 
 
0.2 
 
The unit of observation is a bond measure on a ballot. There are multiple measures per ballot. 
The sample includes both capital and transportation bonds. Under column (2), sample size 
reduces because lag 2 (voter turnout) is not available for all observations (78/1034). Estimates 
are reported with robust clustered errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 
5 and 10% levels. 
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Table 2.17: Probit results for different samples  
 
 
Bond Outcome 
 
Variables Sample 1 
 
Sample 2 
 
Sample 3 
      Probit 
      
Turnout  -2.6584 
 
-2.6099 
 
-2.2840 
 
(0.8757)*** 
 
(0.8529)*** 
 
(0.8063)*** 
IV Probit 
      
Turnout  -0.0465 
 
-0.3485 
 
-0.1016 
 
(1.826) 
 
(1.9542) 
 
(1.9801) 
Density 0.4416 
 
0.4102 
 
0.3714 
 
(0.2305)* 
 
(0.2339)* 
 
(0.2046)* 
Years  0.1001 
 
0.0932 
 
0.1222 
 
(0.0384)*** 
 
(0.0411)** 
 
(0.042)*** 
Enrollment growth 2.9421 
 
3.0103 
 
2.1504 
 
(1.4033)** 
 
(1.3966)** 
 
(1.3422) 
Bond value per pupil -0.4827 
 
-0.6114 
 
-0.5695 
 
(0.2658)* 
 
(0.2846)** 
 
(0.247)** 
Debt per pupil 0.7611 
 
0.8069 
 
0.7521 
 
(0.2973)*** 
 
(0.2995)*** 
 
(0.2783)*** 
No high school -0.4457 
 
-0.3923 
 
-0.5523 
 
(0.285) 
 
(0.2778) 
 
(0.2727)** 
City -1.0105 
 
-1.0604 
 
1.2357 
 
(0.8332) 
 
(0.8254) 
 
(0.5021)** 
Suburb 0.0412 
 
-0.1317 
 
0.9523 
 
(0.5687) 
 
(0.5736) 
 
(0.6381) 
Town Fringe -0.195 
 
-0.3188 
 
1.6429 
 
(0.504) 
 
(0.4959) 
 
(0.7068)** 
Town Distant 0.7031 
 
0.5611 
 
1.5637 
 
(0.4389) 
 
(0.4332) 
 
(0.6565)** 
Rural Fringe 0.4468 
 
0.2788 
 
1.2122 
 
(0.3989) 
 
(0.3904) 
 
(0.7319)* 
Rural Distant 0.0694 
 
-0.0417 
 
1.2459 
 
(0.3181) 
 
(0.2981) 
 
(0.8175) 
Constant 1.4109 
 
1.7125 
 
-0.7228 
 
(0.7311)* 
 
(0.7645)** 
 
(0.688) 
      N 625 
 
662 
 
1034 
R2 0.1686 
 
0.1636 
 
0.1603 
 
The unit of observation is a bond election held in a school district in a year. The dependent 
variable is dichotomous, i.e., one for success and zero for failure. A school bond passes if the 
approval share is greater than or equal to 60% in Oklahoma. Estimates are reported with robust 
clustered errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
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Figure 2.1  
  
 
Note: The data include all school bonds collected by Rogers and Burger, and part of the bonds 
(limited to 17 counties) collected by the consulting company, Stephen H. McDonald and Associates.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rogers & Burge                   257 
                                       elections 
 
388 elections 
 
 
                                    
      
                    Stephen H.     
             McDonald and 
Associates 
 
37 elections 
662 consolidated school bond elections held in 17 counties, Oklahoma, 
1997-2009 
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Figure 2.2 
 
Source: Rogers and Burge (2010), and Stephen H. McDonald and Associates.
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Figure 2.3: Oklahoma school districts and Mesonet station(s) 
 
 
Each block is a school district, with district name in capital letter. Black points indicate 
Mesonet stations. Circles are the coverage of each weather station, with a radius of 30 km. 
 
Scenario 1: For school districts like Erick, weather data are obtained from the station 
located within its boundary (Erick).  
 
Scenario 2: For school districts like Magnum, Mesonet station(s) are located on the 
boundary. Therefore, weather data are averaged from station Erick and Magnum. 
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Figure 2.4 
 
Source: Rogers and Burge (2010), and Stephen H. McDonald and Associates.
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Chapter 3: Self-selection and School Bond Approval 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the school bond literature, research usually focuses on school districts that 
have bond elections, and conclusions are drawn based on observed bond outcomes. 
In fact, such results are more accurately interpreted as conditional results, that is, 
outcomes are observed conditional on the occurrence of bond elections.  
The decision to have a school bond election may be partly related to school 
bond approval since something unobservable, such as stronger tastes for educational 
spending, may encourage school districts to hold bond elections as well as to support 
school capital expenses. Therefore, the characteristics of participating districts may 
not be representative of the population of all school districts. Districts choose to put 
themselves into bond elections (self-selection), and standard regression models may 
produce biased estimates and misleading conclusions for policy makers. To the 
extent that observed bond approval is systematically related to the election 
participation, results from existing research are suspect due to selectivity bias.  
Generally, studies explore the issue of self-selection at the individual level 
(e.g. women’s participation in labor market (Heckman, 1977)), while my research 
adds to the bond literature by investigating the selectivity bias at the district level in a 
panel setting.
17
 By emphasizing the participation in school bond elections I propose a 
two-stage model that distinguishes election participation from school bond approval. 
Using bond data from seventeen counties in Oklahoma between 1997 and 2009, I 
                                               
17 Though the panel is unbalanced and short, I control for district heterogeneity. 
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find evidence of self-selection, suggesting that districts may not be randomly 
selected into a sample. Understanding the nature of the bias in estimation is essential 
for informing school financial policy. 
 
3.2 Self-Selection in the Voting Literature 
Notably, there is scant research on self-selection in the school bond literature. 
In contrast, the issue has been well studied in the voting literature at the individual 
level. Table 3.1 presents the various methods used to examine the effect of self-
selection on voting outcomes. Among these studies, the unit of observation is an 
individual voter. Self-selection becomes a problem when voters’ behaviors are 
different from those of nonvoters. Usually, voters are known to be older, better 
educated, and wealthier. To the extent that those who go to polls are not 
representative of the voting population, election outcomes and resulting policies may 
be biased and skewed towards the preference of voters.  
Bennett and Resnick (1990) investigate the difference between voters and 
nonvoters regarding their policy opinions, partisanships, and ideologies. They find 
that the effect of nonvoting on democracy is minor in the U.S., but nonvoters do 
have a preference for some domestic issues, such as increasing expenditure on 
health, welfare, and education.  
Highton and Wolfinger (1999) consider the group of nonvoters to be 
heterogeneous. For instance, nonvoters are young, mobile, less educated, and poor. 
Despite the diverse composition of nonvoters, none of these groups form a majority 
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and dominate the political preference of nonvoters. Therefore, election outcomes are 
unlikely to vary even if nonvoters were to vote.  
Citrin et al. (2003) suggest that voters and nonvoters differ in the probability 
of voting for democrats and republicans in senate elections in California. To control 
for self-selection, they equalize the turnout rates among different income and racial 
groups by simulating the voting behaviors of nonvoters based on observed individual 
characteristics. Their simulated election outcomes only change in the closely 
contested cases, while others remain unaffected.  
Dubin and Rivers (1989) employ a two-stage model to examine self-selection 
in voting. Voter turnout and voter choice make up two stages. By comparing the 
corrected estimates to the uncorrected ones, Dubin and Rivers find that the revised 
estimates do not switch signs, but the magnitudes change somewhat.  
So far, the previous studies indicate that high turnout from nonvoters only 
alters voting outcomes modestly in general (senate) elections, though it may change 
election outcomes at the local level where voter turnout is evidently smaller (Hajnal, 
Lewis and Louch, 2002).  
The literature on self-selection in school-related elections is limited. 
Rubinfeld and Thomas (1980) investigate a school tax levy proposed in a Detroit 
suburb. The levy was defeated in May but later approved in June 1973. By surveying 
the local electorate, Rubinfeld and Thomas compare the probability of voting yes 
between voters and nonvoters. The differences were not significant.  
Berry and Gersen (2010) analyze the outcomes of school board elections in 
California using a natural experiment. According to a change in the election code in 
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1986, school board elections previously scheduled in odd years (off cycle elections) 
could concur with federal and/or state elections in even years (on cycle elections). 
Because the federal and/or state elections generally attract more voters, turnout rates 
in the concurrent school board elections rose substantially (by 150%). However, such 
change had a minor effect on educational and policy outcomes, e.g. student 
performance and teacher salaries. 
As displayed in Table 3.1, various methods are used to examine the impact of 
self-selection on voting outcomes at the individual level. My work departs from the 
voting literature by focusing on self-selection in school bond elections at the district 
level in a panel setting. 
 
3.3 Empirical Specification 
3.3.1 Model 
 Selectivity bias arises from the potential that school districts may not be 
randomly selected into a sample since unobserved characteristics may systematically 
influence school bond approval and election participation. Accordingly, a two-stage 
model is used to isolate the bond approval stage from the election participation stage 
as follows. 
]0[1  itiitit vZs                                                                         (3.1) 
)1|(  ititiitit suXEy                                                                (3.2) 
Equation (3.1) is known as the selection equation. The indicator sit is a 
dichotomous variable. It is set to one if a school district has bond election(s) in a 
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given year and zero otherwise. The same bond data introduced in the previous 
chapter are used here. The sample includes school bond elections held in 151 school 
districts in Oklahoma between 1997 and 2009 (13 years). Because this indicator is 
observed for all school districts during the sample period, the selection analysis 
includes a total of 1963 observations ( 1963=13*151 ). The variable 
i  captures 
district heterogeneity and 
itZ  
consists of factors related to election participation, i.e. 
years since the last election and past bond success.  
Equation (3.2) is known as the outcome equation. It includes 643 
observations where school bond approval is observed conditional on the occurrence 
of bond elections ( sit =1).
18
 The dependent variable yit  is the approval share, 
defined as the percent of yes votes in a school bond election. Similarly, the variable 
i  reflects district heterogeneity, and itX  includes factors associated with bond 
approval, i.e. bond attributes, school needs, and district demographic factors. 
Variable descriptions and summary statistics are presented in Chapter 2, Tables 2.3 
and 2.4. 
To the extent that observed bond approval may not be independent of 
election participation, the current sample may not be representative of the underlying 
population. In a cross sectional setting, the unobserved factors work through the 
error term. The conditional expectation of the error term is included to account for 
the potential selectivity bias, and it is known as the inverse mills ratio (Heckman, 
                                               
18
 Bond elections held in the same year are combined into one observation (19/643). To correct for 
selection bias, inverse mills ratios would be added to the baseline model. For observations in the same 
year, the ratios are exactly the same. To avoid that, multiple elections held in the same district in a 
year are consolidated. 
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1977). In a panel setting, the unobserved elements may work through the district 
heterogeneity (fixed effect) and/or the error term, and two additional terms are 
needed: the conditional expectation of the district fixed effect, and the conditional 
expectation of the error term. Because it is computationally burdensome to construct 
the two additional terms (Ridder, 1990), Verbeek and Nijman (1992) propose 
selection tests that do not require specifying the selection mechanism. Conditional on 
the assumption that the selection determinants are time invariant, the fixed effect 
(FE) estimates are more robust than the random effect (RE) estimates. Based on this 
notion, Verbeek and Nijman propose a selection test that compares the FE and RE 
estimates of balanced and unbalanced panel regressions.
19
 Statistical difference 
among these estimates may indicate selectivity bias. Similarly, Kyriazidou (1997) 
uses first differencing to get rid of the time invariant selection determinants. Either 
fixed effect or first difference accounts for the selection issue to the extent that 
factors influencing self-selection are constant over time. However, at the meantime, 
these estimation methods also remove the effect of other relevant factors, e.g., 
district locale, which is a point of interest in this study.  
In addition, my sample is unique in the sense that the panel is balanced for 
the selection analysis (1963) but unbalanced and short for the outcome analysis 
(643). Due to the nature of the data, it’s not appropriate to allow for different slope 
coefficients across groups (fixed effect) since the number of regressors would go to 
infinity. Consequently, I follow the procedures detailed in Wooldridge (1995), where 
a pooled OLS is used to circumvent the above-mentioned problems and produce 
                                               
19
 There are four sets of estimates, fixed effect estimates of balanced and unbalanced panel 
regressions, and random effect estimates of balanced and unbalanced panel regressions. 
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consistent estimates. Wooldridge (1995) specifies district heterogeneity as a function 
of the observed characteristics in each year. While this approach uses too many 
degrees of freedom in estimation,
20
 my specification is different in the manner that 
heterogeneity is explained by the time averages of the observed demographic factors 
(Mundlak, 1978).  
 
3.3.2 Data 
During the sample period (1997-2009), some school districts had bond 
elections every year and others less often, with an average of 4.26 elections per 
district (643/151=4.26). Table 2.3 in Chapter 2 presents the bond election frequency 
for each school district during the sample period, and Figure 2.2 shows the 
distribution.  
Basic demographic factors are compared between districts with bond election 
frequencies above the average (>4) and those with election frequencies below the 
average (<=4). Due to the large standard deviations, some statistics of the two groups 
are not different from each other (Table 3.2). On average, districts with election 
frequencies above the average have larger overall population (19,000 vs. 9,650), 
denser pupil distribution (88.2 vs. 19.2 per square mile), and higher enrollment 
growth rate (1.15% vs. 0.45%). However, the per-pupil bond-issuing value is 
actually lower (1,970 vs. 2,321), suggesting that school capital expenses may be 
underfunded in these communities. Other demographics such as educational 
attainment, income, debt, pupil-teacher ratio, and property values are not statistically 
                                               
20
 According to my sample, an independent variable would expand to 13 (1997-2009) variables 
following the Wooldridge approach. This may not be desirable for estimation in a shot panel. 
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different between the two groups. Therefore, it is likely that some districts request 
school capital spending more frequently via bonds because they have larger student 
populations to accommodate.  
In addition, school districts with election frequencies above the average are 
concentrated in urban/suburban areas, e.g. four out of six urban districts and fourteen 
out of sixteen suburban districts are above the average. While districts with election 
frequencies below the average are clustered in rural areas, i.e. 48 out of 62 rural 
distant districts and eight out of ten rural remote districts.  
 
3.4 Results 
According to the two-stage selection model, results are reported in Table 3.3. 
Column (1) shows the first stage selection analysis following a pooled probit, and 
column (2) displays the second stage outcome analysis using a pooled ordinary least 
squares. Time effects are included in both stages. To see whether self-selection is a 
problem in my sample, inverse mills ratios are computed according to the selection 
equation and then added to the outcome regression. The estimated coefficient of the 
ratio is highly significant, with a P value of 0% (T stat: 4.32, column (2), Table 3.3). 
Rho, the correlation between the error terms from the two stages (Equations 3.1 and 
3.2), is big (rho: 0.7647), suggesting that the two bond stages are strongly correlated. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis of no selection bias can be rejected.  
Even controlling for the potential differences across school districts (e.g., 
demographics, time effects, and heterogeneity), selectivity bias is evident. The result 
implies that districts may diverge in unobserved characteristics, such as preferences 
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in educational spending. To the extent that observed bond approval is partly related 
to election participation, it is important to give careful attention to self-selection. 
Failure to account for selectivity bias would lead to inconsistent estimates, which 
may provide wrong implications for school finance policy. 
An important determinant of both bond approval and election participation is 
district locale. The effect is interesting. School district locale ranges from large city 
to rural remote. The category omitted in the analysis is city. Concerning the selection 
stage, large urban districts are more likely to have bond elections than small rural 
areas (column (1), Table 3.3). A possible reason is that student populations grow 
faster in urban districts (Oklahoma, 1.15% vs. 0.45%), which may request school 
capital spending more frequently in order to accommodate the increase demand. In 
addition, small and large districts may use different tactics. Elections are costly in 
terms of manpower to draft, develop, and campaign bonds, but the costs could be 
less binding for large urban districts. Therefore, they may have bond elections more 
frequently. 
Relating to the outcome stage, rural fringe and suburban areas tend to provide 
greater support for school bonds, compared to urban districts (column (2), Table 
3.3). The results are consistent with the findings of the previous studies (Lentz, 1999; 
Maher and Skidmore, 2009). Lentz (1999) suggests that land use is relatively 
homogeneous in small rural and suburban districts in Illinois. Therefore, it is easier 
to reach agreements in those homogenous communities. The two-stage selection 
model reveals more information regarding the locale effect on school bond elections. 
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Nevertheless, the data oversample urban/suburban districts in Oklahoma, so the 
results should be interpreted with caution. 
Another interesting factor, past bond success, impacts the selection stage 
significantly. The variable is coded one if the last school bond passed in the same 
district and zero otherwise.
21
 According to the selection stage, past bond success 
lowers the probability of having bond elections in the near future (-0.9313, column 
(1), Table 3.3). Districts are less likely to issue new bonds if they gained support 
recently. Nevertheless, as time goes by, school districts tend to have new bond 
elections regardless of the previous results: the factor, years, is positively associated 
with the probability of having new bond elections (0.1849, column (1), Table 3.3). 
Cellini, Ferreira, Rothstein (2010) suggest that authorizing a bond negatively 
influences the probability of passing future bonds, and the effect would last for five 
years. In contrast, my results imply that past bond success lowers the chance of 
having new bond elections but not the probability of passing new bonds, and such 
influence would also lasts for five years (0.9313/0.1849=5, column (1), Table 3.3). 
Other explanatory variables, such as voter turnout, bond value, student 
density and enrollment growth influence bond approval but not election 
participation. All estimated coefficients have the expected signs. The first two 
capture bond attributes, which negatively impact bond approval. The latter two are 
measures of local school needs, and are positively associated with bond approval. 
The ‘no high school’ dummy indicates districts that only provide elementary 
                                               
21
 A school bond is considered as a success if the approval share is greater than or equal to 60% (the 
super majority rule in Oklahoma). On average, the last bond election happened 2.5 years ago. 
Nevertheless, the factor is not available for all observations, so a dummy is included to account for 
those with missing values (20/643).  
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education. These districts are relatively small in terms of population size. Compared 
with other school districts, they are less likely to engage in bond elections. Out of 28 
districts without a high school, only four have bond election frequencies that are 
above the average. 
The two-stage selection model distinguishes between the bond outcome stage 
and the election participation stage, providing some insight regarding the effects of 
demographics in different bond stages. Even accounting for the potential differences 
across school districts (e.g. demographics, time effects, and heterogeneity), there is 
selectivity bias. To the degree that school bond outcomes are observed conditional 
on the occurrence of bond elections, self-selection deserves more attention in 
empirical modeling.  
 
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
The empirical approach used in this study explores the concern that school 
districts may select themselves into bond elections. Observed bond approval is partly 
related to the decision to have a bond election. Therefore, the sample may not be 
representative of the underlying population of school districts. According to the 
selection test, the estimated coefficient of the inverse mills ratio reaches the 
conventional levels of statistical significance, implying that there exists selectivity 
bias. Ignoring self-selection, estimates are inconsistent, and conclusions may be 
misleading for districts that plan to finance school spending via future bond issues.  
One might be concerned that self-selection should be accounted for in the 
analysis of my previous chapter. In fact, accounting for selectivity bias, the estimates 
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of voter turnout change slightly, and the results presented in Chapter 2 are robust to 
self-selection. 
To this point, I have maintained the assumption that school districts select 
themselves into bond elections, and observed bond approval is related to election 
participation. More broadly, the proposed self-selection problem is not limited to the 
framework of school bonds. In fact, it applies to elections of various types (e.g., 
elections for metropolitan government reform, recreational facilities, and sales taxes) 
since it is a potential problem in a wide range of policy studies. To gain a better 
understanding of the mechanism by which election outcomes are achieved, self-
selection need to be given careful thought.  
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Table 3.3: A two-stage selection model 
 
 
Selection/ 
Election participation 
 
Outcome/ 
Bond approval 
 
Variables Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
 
Inverse mills ratio 
  
0.0987 
   
(0.0229)*** 
Density 
  
0.0109 
   
(0.0037)*** 
Enrollment growth 
  
0.2649 
   
(0.0934)*** 
Bond value per pupil 
  
-0.0676 
   
(0.015)*** 
Turnout  
  
-0.2 
   
(0.0548)***  
No high school -0.4696 
 
 
 (0.098)*** 
 
 
Past bond success -0.9313 
 
 
 (0.1114)*** 
 
 
Years  0.1849 
 
0.0161 
 (0.0199)*** 
 
(0.0033)*** 
Dummy  -0.426 
 
-0.1297 
 
(0.1913)** 
 
(0.0374)*** 
Suburb 0.1786 
 
0.0578 
 
(0.1726) 
 
(0.023)** 
Town fringe 0.0289 
 
0.0585 
 
(0.1924) 
 
(0.0274)** 
Town distant -0.4304 
 
0.0502 
 
(0.1864)** 
 
(0.0295)* 
Rural fringe -0.3632 
 
0.0527 
 
(0.1697)** 
 
(0.0271)** 
Rural distant -0.4516 
 
0.0364 
 
(0.1631)*** 
 
(0.0268) 
Rural remote -0.5136 
 
0.0083 
 
(0.1991)*** 
 
(0.0332) 
Constant 0.2773 
 
0.5351 
 
(0.2422) 
 
(0.0419)*** 
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Table 3.3 continued 
 
Variables Approval Share 
 
 
First Stage/Selection 
 
Second Stage/Outcome 
 
Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
 
District heterogeneity 
 
 
Debt _average 0.4264 
 
0.09 
 
(0.1389)*** 
 
(0.0204)*** 
College degree or above _average 3.4648 
 
-0.009 
 
(1.3946)** 
 
(0.07) 
    N 1963 
 
643 
R2 0.1173 
 
0.202 
Rho 
  
0.7647 
 
Note: The unit of observation is a consolidated capital bond election held in a school district 
in a year. Estimates are reported with robust clustered errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
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Chapter 4: Do Rich Districts Support Public School Bonds? 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter explores the relationship between local property values and 
school bond approval. Bonds are financed via future property taxes, which are 
collected on the basis of property values following several steps. First, a county 
assessor appraises the market value of a property based on its land and improvement 
values. Next, the market value is multiplied by the assessment ratio in order to obtain 
the assessed value. Then, if the property owner is qualified for exemptions, certain 
amounts are deducted from the assessed value, and the remaining is the taxable 
value. Finally, a property tax rate, measured in mills, is applied to the taxable value 
to calculate the tax bill. The whole procedure is detailed in Figure 4.1.  
Generated property tax revenues are used to provide local public goods and 
services, such as schools, libraries, and government projects. On average, 70% of the 
tax revenues are apportioned for public schools (Oklahoma Tax Commission, 2012). 
Among these school revenues, up to five mills may be collected for the purpose of 
school capital expenses, in other words, bonds (Article X, Section 9B, Oklahoma 
Constitution).  
 
4.1.1 One-way: from Property Values to School Bond Approval  
School bonds provide an important mechanism of financing school capital 
outlays. To issue bonds, voter support is needed in local elections, and property 
values, as a measure of property tax base, are commonly used to explain bond 
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outcomes in the literature. Usually, a high property value implies a large tax base. To 
raise the same amount of money via bonds in homogenous communities, the average 
tax burden is smaller for districts with high property values, compared to those with 
low property values. Therefore, property values are found to be positively associated 
with school bond approval (Theobald and Meier, 2002; Maher and Skidmore, 2009). 
The positive relationship is also supported in Lentz’s study, where voter support 
increases with an expanded property tax base, measured by the percentage change in 
equalized assessed valuation (EAV) from the prior year. However, EAV per capita, 
another factor that captures the economic conditions of a school district, is negative 
and significant in the same regression. Lentz (1999) argues that property values are 
generally low in those districts in her sample, so the associated property tax rates 
might already be high in order to compensate for the small tax bases. While high 
current rates are not desirable for future school taxation, bond approval falls. Other 
studies also find property values to be negatively associated with school bond 
success, but the estimated coefficients are insignificant (Rueben and Cerdán, 2003; 
Zimmer and Jones 2005; Maher and Skidmore, 2008). Similarly, as is documented in 
my previous research (Chapter 2), property values fail to attain the standard levels of 
statistical significance when used in the bond approval analysis. Consequently, the 
literature regarding the relationship between property values and bond approval is 
inconclusive. 
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4.1.2 Other Way: from School Capital Expenses (Bonds) to Property Values  
 Bonds are meant to finance school capital expenses. More capital spending is 
associated with better school facilities, and improved school facilities are good for 
student safety as well as student learning. These school amenities are capitalized into 
local property values. Property owners are concerned with public school spending 
largely due to property capitalization. 
Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010) evaluate the economic returns of 
investing in school facilities on various school outputs, including student 
performance, housing prices, and district income/racial composition. Compared with 
student test scores, housing prices measure school output in a better way since 
benefits, such as student safety and health, are also included. These amenities 
associated with improved school facilities are capitalized into local housing prices, 
but may not be reflected in student performance. Generally, school impacts are hard 
to isolate from the numerous environmental/socioeconomic elements related to 
outcomes. In order to identify the effects of school capital investments, Cellini, 
Ferreira and Rothstein use a regression discontinuity design that compares school 
bonds passed and failed by close margin. It is found that bond initiatives raise local 
housing prices by six percent two or three years after bond passage, and such 
positive effect would last for a decade. On the contrary, bond passage has minor 
impact on local racial/income composition and ambiguous effect on student test 
scores. 
The research relating to the effect of school capital investments (bonds) on 
local housing prices is limited, so it is worth looking at the literature that focuses on 
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the relationship between general school spending and property values. Oates (1969) 
investigates the empirical connection between property taxes and property values. He 
finds that increased property tax rates depress property values. However, if collected 
tax revenues are used to increase local public spending, public schools in particular, 
the benefits associated with the spending may offset the depressive effect on 
property values. People take into account the level of local public services (primarily 
public schools) when they decide where to locate.  
Hilber and Mayer (2009) examine how property capitalization can influence 
public school spending in Massachusetts. By looking at areas where little 
developable land is available, they use land supply as a proxy for capitalization and 
find that residents vote to increase school expenditure at a faster rate in those 
communities. The results support the idea that property capitalization drives public 
school spending.  
Numerous studies have further explored the relationship between school 
quality and housing prices (Black, 1999; Figlio and Lucas, 2004). For the purpose of 
this research, they are not closely related and are not discussed. The presented 
literature concentrates on the relationship between property values and school 
spending (Figure 4.2). Among these studies, some focus on the effect of property 
values as an important financing source for school capital expenses (bonds), and 
others show the impact of school (capital) spending on local property values due to 
capitalization. Consequently, property values may be endogenous to school bond 
approval. The previous studies do not account for this endogenous relationship and 
simply use an ordinary least squares (OLS) approach to examine the role of property 
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values in explaining school bond approval. Therefore, the results may be suspect 
concerning the impact of property values.  
Based on this notion, my study complements the literature by exploring the 
endogenous relationship between property values and bond approval. Using cross 
sectional bond data from Oklahoma (2005-2009 five-year estimates), an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression produces a highly insignificant relationship following 
the previous research. In contrast, using an instrumental variable (IV) approach, the 
endogenous effect of property values is disentangled. The IV estimate is much larger 
in magnitude and is significant at the conventional levels of statistical significance. 
An interesting finding of this study is that property values are negatively signed, 
implying that there may be less support for school bonds in districts with higher 
property values. In fact, the negative effect of property values may reflect 
community heterogeneity to some extent. My study offers a better understanding of 
the relationship between property values and bond approval. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 4.2 specifies the 
empirical model and data, section 4.3 discusses the results, and section 4.4 
concludes. 
 
4.2 Empirical Specification 
4.2.1 Model 
To identify the effect of property values on school bond approval, a baseline 
model is proposed at the district level: 
  XvaluepropertyApproval 210                                          (4.1)  
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The dependent variable Approval is the share of yes votes in a school bond 
election. It indicates the extent of voter support for school capital spending. The set 
X  includes factors associated with bond approval, such as district demographics, 
school needs, and bond/election characteristics. Property values are used as one of 
the explanatory factors that are relevant for school bond approval. Chapter 2 details 
the variable descriptions and summary statistics (Tables 2.3 and 2.4). 
 
4.2.2 Data  
Since property values may be endogenous to bond approval, appropriate 
instruments are needed for the endogenous factor. Research suggests that physical 
features of structures, such as square footage, lot size, age, bedrooms, bathrooms, 
garage, and air conditioning, are significant determinants of property values
22
 (Black, 
1999; Bogarta and Cromwell, 2000; Zietz, Zietz, and Sirmans, 2007; Dehring, 
Depken, and Ward, 2008). Therefore, these features are used to identify the true 
effect of property values on school bond approval. Per pupil property value is 
obtained from the Office of Accountability (Oklahoma), which reports community 
characteristics, school educational processes, and student performance in its 
publication: School and District Report Card.  
Physical features of structures at the district level are collected from the 
American Community Survey (ACS) of the U.S. Census Bureau. The ACS provides 
nationwide data about communities’ demographics, social economics, and housing 
characteristics. Typically, the ACS reports three types of data: one-year, three-year, 
                                               
22
 To be accurate, physical features of structures are important determinants of housing values, which 
make up the majority of property values. 
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and five-year estimates, all of which represent data collected over some specific time 
periods. The one-year estimates are available for areas with populations of 65,000 or 
more. For small geographic areas, such as cities, school districts, and census tracts, 
the ACS surveys too few households to provide reliable yearly data. Therefore, data 
from multiple years are pooled together to obtain the three-year and five-year cross 
sectional estimates for those jurisdictions. In fact, data precision improves. For 
instance, the five-year estimates are reported with the smallest margin of errors. 
Every year, the ACS surveys nearly three millions addresses, two thirds of which 
respond. By the end of 2009, the ACS had surveyed 15 million addresses, and the 
first five-year estimates (2005-2009) were published in 2010. For school districts in 
Oklahoma, because the average population is relatively small (15,079), only five-
year estimates are available. Hence, the 2005-2009 estimates are used in my study.  
Physical features of structures includes the year the structure was built, the 
number of units in structure, rooms, bedrooms, kitchen facilities, plumbing facilities, 
heating fuels, telephone service, and vehicles. All of them are reported in 
percentages at the school district level. Concerning the year when a structure was 
built, it is further categorized into seven groups: structures built after 2000, 1990-
1999, 1980-1989, 1960-1979, 1940-1959, and before 1939. Relating to the number 
of units in a structure, those with one, two, and more units are separately identified. 
The numbers of rooms, bedrooms, and vehicles are also separately identified. In 
terms of the heating fuel used, structures are classified as those that use utility gas, 
bottled/tank/LP gas, electricity, fuel oil/kerosene, coal/coke, other fuels, and no fuel. 
Regarding the home facilities, the percent of structures with complete plumbing, 
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kitchen, and telephone services are reported at the school district level, respectively. 
Table 4.1 shows the summary statistics. 
Because physical features of structures are five-year and cross-sectional 
estimates, bond data are consolidated accordingly. School bond information and 
sources are presented in Chapter 2. Multiple bond elections held in the same district 
between 2005 and 2009 are combined into one bond according to their issuing 
values.
23
 The final sample includes 132
24
 observations, that is, one representative 
school bond per district per time period (2005-2009). 
 
4.2.3 Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach 
4.2.3.1 Validation of the instrumental variable approach 
To validate the application of the IV approach, I employ a Hausman test to 
examine if property values are endogenously determined in the bond approval 
equation. Property values regressed on the proposed instruments (physical features of 
structures) and other explanatory variables. The residuals are added to the baseline 
model, with a coefficient that is statistically different from zero (Table 4.2). This 
sensitivity test indicates that the OLS estimates are inconsistent, so an IV approach is 
necessary.  
 
 
 
                                               
23
 226 bonds are consolidated into 132 representative bonds. 
24
 There are a total of 151 school districts in seventeen counties in Oklahoma. Not all of them had 
bond elections during the period. 
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4.2.3.2 Under-identification Test 
 A valid instrument must be correlated with the endogenous variable, property 
values in this case. To test this condition, physical features of structures and other 
demographic variables are used to explain property values. As can be seen in Table 
4.3, various features are significant determinants. Physical conditions, such as the 
number of rooms and bedrooms in a structure, are positively associated with property 
values, while characteristics, such as using fuel oil/kerosene as heating materials, is 
negatively related to property values. Therefore, the under-identification hypothesis 
can be rejected according to the test statistic (37.257, P value: 0%, Table 4.3). 
 
4.2.3.3 Over-identification Test 
A second condition is that the instrument should be exogenous to the bond 
approval equation. To check this condition, residuals from the baseline model are 
regressed on the proposed instruments (physical features of structures) and 
explanatory variables. The resulting estimates are not different from zero, with a 
Hansen J statistic of 5.513 (P value: 59.76%, Table 4.3), so the null hypothesis that 
the instruments are exogenous to the bond outcome equation cannot be rejected.  
Consequently, the proposed instruments are valid and an IV approach 
produces consistent estimates. Physical features of structures will be used to 
instrument property values in the analysis to follow.  
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4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
Following the baseline model (Equation 4.1), results of the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression are shown in column (1), Table 4.4. The OLS estimate of 
property values is small (-0.0556) and insignificant (p value: 22%), suggesting that 
property values have a minor effect on bond approval. This result is in line with the 
findings of the previous studies, where the coefficient of property values is negative 
and insignificant (Rueben and Cerdán, 2003; Zimmer and Jones 2005; Maher and 
Skidmore, 2008). To obtain a clearer picture of the relationship between property 
values and school bond approval, the endogenous factor is instrumented, and a two-
stage IV approach is employed. 
 
4.3.2 Instrumental Variable Regression 
 Consistent IV estimates are reported in column (2), Table 4.4. Several 
differences are worth noting between the OLS and IV models. IV regression yields 
an estimate that is much larger in absolute value (-0.2368 vs. -0.0556). Although the 
standard errors are larger under the IV regression, the estimated coefficient of 
property values is statistically significant (P value, 2.4%). Also notable in the IV 
model is that property values are negatively signed, implying that districts with high 
property values may provide less voter support for school bonds. The results are 
contrary to those of Theobald and Meier (2002), who identify a positive relationship 
between property values and bond passage following an OLS approach. 
Nevertheless, my results are in line with the findings of an early study summarized 
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by Piele and Hall (1973): communities with higher average owner-occupied housing 
values tend to have greater negative votes in school financial elections, including tax 
and bond elections (Mcmahon, 1966). It is through the analysis of endogeneity that 
an important relationship is revealed. The results raise interesting questions 
regarding homeowners’ voting behaviors and rationales. 
It is confusing that bond approval falls with property values. A possible 
reason is that communities with high property values may be relatively more 
heterogeneous than those with low property values. There are two types of 
heterogeneity: difference in the composition of property tax base (agricultural, 
residential, commercial, and industrial property) and dispersion in values (property 
values, housing values, and income). By including district locale, the first type of 
heterogeneity is accounted for to the extent that the composition of property tax base 
varies as district locale changes. The second type of heterogeneity is the focus of my 
study. Bonds are paid back via future property taxes, which are collected on the basis 
of property values. Due to the difference in property values, the tax bill associated 
with bond issues may be unevenly distributed among property owners, and rich 
families may bear the big portion of the costs. Nevertheless, the educational benefits 
enjoyed by students do not differ according to their tax payments. When costs 
exceed benefits, these rich families may provide less support for public school 
bonds. If high property values are associated with community heterogeneity, then 
bond approval falls with property values since it is hard to reach an agreement in a 
heterogeneous community. 
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To see if this justification holds true, the relationship between property values 
and community heterogeneity is explored. Heterogeneity is measured by the housing 
value dispersion
25
 within a school district. An indicator is constructed as the 
difference between the upper (75%) and lower (25%) housing value quartiles divided 
by the median (Rockoff, 2010). Including the dispersion indicator in the bond 
approval analysis, I find that it is negatively and significantly associated with bond 
approval (-0.067, P value: 2.7%, column (1), Table 4.5), while the coefficient of 
property values becomes insignificant (-0.167, P value: 15%, column (1), Table 4.5). 
As a result, it is highly likely that property values influence school bond approval 
through the channel of community heterogeneity. 
To visualize the relationship, bond approval and dispersion are plotted 
against property values (Figures 4.3 and 4.4). At first, bond approval falls with 
property values largely due to community heterogeneity since dispersion rises with 
property values. However, as property values continue to increase, dispersion 
decreases, and communities become more homogenous. Meanwhile, bond approval 
rises. To some extent, the relationship between property values and bond approval 
may capture the effect of community heterogeneity.  
 Lentz (1999) offers another explanation to justify the negative effect of 
property values on bond approval. She argues that the property values may be 
generally low in the school districts in her sample. To compensate for the small tax 
bases, current tax rates might already be high in these communities. While high rates 
are not desirable for future school taxation, bond approval falls. To test for this 
                                               
25
 Dispersion in property values is not available. Therefore, this factor is used instead since housing 
values are a big part of property values. 
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possibility, tax rates are plotted against property values. According to Figure 4.5, as 
property values increase, tax rates rise. Including tax rates in the bond approval 
analysis, the factor is highly insignificant (P value: 39.3%), consistent with the 
findings of Maher and Skidmore (2009). However, the coefficient of property values 
remains negative and significant (-0.2158, P value: 8.1%, column (2), Table 4.5). As 
a result, tax rates do not appear to explain the negative effect of property values.  
Consequently, property values may influence school bond approval 
negatively due to community heterogeneity. In contrast, bond success has a positive 
effect on local property values due to capitalization (Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein, 
2010). The traditional OLS model may capture both effects that are in opposite 
directions, so the resulting estimate approaches zero (-0.0556, column (1), Table 
4.4). The uncorrected OLS model may conceal the relationship between property 
values and bond approval due to the mixed directions of influences. Once the process 
is disentangled, I find that bond approval falls with property values.  
 
4.3.3 Robustness Checks 
 To ensure that the results reflect the underlying relationship between property 
values and school bond approval, several robustness tests are explored. The ACS 
data are published with margin of error (MOE), which suggests that with a 90% 
chance, the reported estimates would fall into the range (mean-MOE, mean+MOE). 
In this section, I use the lower bound (mean-MOE) and upper bound values 
(mean+MOE) of physical features to re-examine the effect of property values. 
Regressions in Table 4.4 are repeated, and similar results hold. Under the IV 
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specifications, the estimates are much larger in absolute values and are closer to the 
standard levels of statistical significance (-0.2215, P value: 2.1%, Table 4.6, and -
0.2506, P value: 1.8%, Table 4.7). Results of the bound values analysis are consistent 
with those of the mean value.  
In addition, compared with property values, one might be concerned that 
housing values may capture the two-way effect between local taxable resources and 
school bond approval in a better way. First, school amenities are capitalized into 
housing prices since quality education makes local housing more attractive. Second, 
physical features of structures are more closely associated with housing values rather 
than property values, which not only include the building values (improvement 
values), but also the land values. Third, property values are more comprehensive 
than housing values since property contains residential, commercial, industrial, and 
public estates. As a result, in this section, housing values are used to explain school 
bond approval instead of property values, despite the fact that school taxes associated 
with bond issues are collected on the basis of property values. 
The ACS provides five-year estimates on aggregate owner occupied housing 
values, which are divided by student populations to get the per pupil level data. 
Features of owner-occupied housing units are used to identify the effect of housing 
values on bond approval. Regardless of the fact that the physical features capture the 
variations in housing values in a better way, the regression matrix is almost singular. 
The analogous OLS estimate of housing values is extremely small (-6.79e-06) and 
highly insignificant (99%), while the IV estimate approaches -0.0145, with a P value 
of 18.3%. The substantial increase in the magnitude of IV estimate is astonishing, 
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but the results should be interpreted with caution. Furthermore, apart from the per 
pupil level housing values, average housing values are also studied in the bond 
approval analysis. Once again, the estimate improves under the IV specification, 
both in magnitude (-0.0147 vs. -0.0279) and statistical significance (39.8% vs. 
19.4%), though it fails to reach the standard level. Consequently, it is difficult to say 
whether the negative relationship between housing values and bond approval is 
robust, but the IV approach certainly sheds light on endogeneity.  
 
4.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, I evaluate the importance of property values for explaining 
school bond approval. Accounting for endogeneity, a slightly negative relationship 
emerges, and it is different from what is generally expected.  
 While this study improves our understanding of the relationship between 
property values and bond approval, it also raises a lot of questions. For local public 
goods other than schools, such as hospitals, parks, and recreational services, do rich 
school districts provide support for these public projects? Does heterogeneity 
influence voting outcomes? Do these district vote in a similar manner as they do for 
school bonds? These questions are beyond the scope of my current work, but they 
are worth exploring in the future.  
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Table 4.1: Physical features of structures (percentages) 
 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
 
    Total occupied units 6.3411 16.7597 0.198 121.417 
 
Number of units in structures 
     
1, detached 74.9182 10.3512 39 96.6 
1, attached 1.1515 1.3361 0 6.5 
2 apartments 0.9871 1.6393 0 9.1 
3-4 apartments 1.1962 1.7073 0 8.2 
5-9 apartments 1.6212 2.7502 0 16.4 
10 or more apartments 2.2636 4.4281 0 23.1 
Mobile home 17.8606 11.9131 0.8 45.7 
 
Year the structure was built 
     
Later than 2000 12.5121 8.6916 0.7 44.8 
1990-1999 16.0000 7.4504 0.9 36.7 
1980-1989 17.6977 6.3736 2.4 37.5 
1960-1979 31.0924 8.3354 10.3 52.9 
1940-1959 13.5614 9.9414 0.8 54 
Before 1939 9.1341 6.8467 0 30.7 
 
Rooms 
     
1 room 0.3742 0.5629 0 2.4 
2-3 rooms 5.3258 3.9324 0 21.6 
4-5 rooms 42.9727 9.4340 7.1 73 
6-7 rooms 38.5000 7.1350 16.9 53.7 
8 or more rooms 12.8182 7.9028 0.6 69.7 
 
Bedrooms 
     
No bedroom 0.4485 0.6172 0 2.7 
1 bedroom 4.9962 4.1566 0 23.5 
2-3 bedrooms 78.5780 8.0608 38.9 92.6 
4 or more bedrooms 15.9780 7.5070 4.3 60.7 
 
Complete facilities 
     
With complete plumbing service 99.5356 0.6029 96.4 100 
With complete kitchen service 99.1780 0.9251 94.9 100 
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Table 4.1 continued 
 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
 
    Vehicles available 
     
No vehicle 3.7992 2.4671 0 10.1 
1 vehicle 26.0439 8.3497 5.5 51.1 
2 vehicles 41.1553 5.7722 29 55.4 
3 or more vehicles 29.0061 8.6799 9.9 57.2 
 
Telephone service available 
     
With telephone service 95.8394 2.6217 88 100 
 
House heating fuel 
     
Utility gas 45.4992 22.4247 0.2 82.9 
Bottled, tank, or LP gas 17.3424 13.7516 0 68 
Electricity 30.5462 9.7939 9.4 62.8 
Fuel oil, kerosene, etc. 0.4485 1.2796 0 9.3 
Coal or coke 0.0068 0.0632 0 0.7 
All other fuels 6.0121 7.4572 0 34.3 
No fuel used 0.1424 0.2948 0 1.5 
     Total observations 
   
132 
 
Source: American Community Survey, 2005-2009 five-year estimates 
Note: The sample is cross sectional. All features are measured in percentages at the school district 
level, and the total occupied units are measured in 1,000.  
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Table 4.2: Validation of the IV approach 
 
Variables Approval Share 
 
 Residual 0.2404 
 
(0.1162)** 
Property value per pupil -0.2368 
 
(0.1041)** 
Years  0.0145 
 
(0.0028)*** 
Past bond success 0.1638 
 
(0.0222)*** 
Bond value per pupil -0.047 
 
(0.0177)*** 
Enrollment growth 0.6654 
 
(0.4059) 
Population -0.0373 
 
(0.0197)* 
College or above 0.4462 
 
(0.2615)* 
Black -0.1462 
 
(0.0631)** 
Suburb -0.0506 
 
(0.0388) 
Rural remote -0.1761 
 
(0.0449)*** 
Rural fringe -0.0502 
 
(0.0441) 
Rural distant -0.0957 
 
(0.0425)** 
Town fringe -0.1067 
 
(0.0435)** 
Town distant -0.0915 
 
(0.0467)** 
Constant 0.3506 
 
(0.214) 
  N 132 
R2 0.5459 
 
Note: the unit of observation is a consolidated school bond election held in district i. The sample 
is cross sectional. Estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
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Table 4.3: First stage results 
 
Variables Property value per pupil 
 
 Fuel oil/kerosene/etc. -0.0337 
 
(0.0063)*** 
4 bedrooms or more 0.0089 
 
(0.0046)** 
8 rooms or more 0.0009 
 
(0.0036) 
3 vehicles or more 0.0019 
 
(0.002) 
Total occupied units 0.0089 
 
(0.0127) 
All other fuels 0.0029 
 
(0.002) 
Square miles 0.0004 
 
(0.0003) 
College degree or above 1.2479 
 
(0.3047)*** 
High school diploma 1.1565 
 
(0.4717)**  
Black 0.1529 
 
(0.1139) 
Suburb -0.108 
 
(0.1232) 
Rural remote -0.1086 
 
(0.1551) 
Rural fringe -0.1049 
 
(0.1391) 
Rural distant -0.0629 
 
(0.1415) 
Town fringe -0.1683 
 
(0.1302) 
Town distant -0.0509 
 
(0.1386) 
Constant -0.8361 
 
(0.3851)** 
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Table 4.3 continued 
 
Variables Property value per pupil 
 
 Test Statistics 
 
Under identification test (Anderson canon. 
Corr. LR statistic) 37.257*** 
Over identification test (Hansen J statistic) 5.513 
N 132 
R2 0.4916 
 
Note: the unit of observation is a consolidated school bond election held in district i. The sample 
is cross sectional. Estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
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Table 4.4: OLS and IV results 
 
 
                           Approval Share 
Variables 
 
OLS 
 
IV 
 
   Property value per pupil -0.0556 
 
-0.2368 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.118)** 
Years  0.015 
 
0.0145 
 
(0.003)*** 
 
(0.0032)*** 
Past bond success 0.1677 
 
0.1638 
 
(0.0228)*** 
 
(0.0231)*** 
Bond value per pupil -0.0523 
 
-0.047 
 
(0.0191)*** 
 
(0.0183)*** 
Enrollment growth 0.6724 
 
0.6654 
 
(0.4286) 
 
(0.4526) 
Population -0.0285 
 
-0.0373 
 
(0.0187) 
 
(0.0221)* 
College or above 0.1605 
 
0.4462 
 
(0.1977) 
 
(0.02721)* 
Black -0.1455 
 
-0.1462 
 
(0.0506)*** 
 
(0.0457)*** 
Suburb -0.0347 
 
-0.0506 
 
(0.0407) 
 
(0.0535) 
Rural remote -0.1772 
 
-0.1761 
 
(0.0461)*** 
 
(0.0605)*** 
Rural fringe -0.0431 
 
-0.0502 
 
(0.0457) 
 
(0.0593) 
Rural distant -0.0968 
 
-0.0957 
 
(0.0441)** 
 
(0.0581)* 
Town fringe -0.0866 
 
-0.1067 
 
(0.0454)* 
 
(0.058)* 
Town distant -0.0839 
 
-0.0915 
 
(0.0496)* 
 
(0.0621) 
Constant 0.4593 
 
0.3506 
 
(0.1955)** 
 
(0.2324) 
    N 132 
 
132 
R2 0.5263 
 
0.4662 
 
Note: the unit of observation is a consolidated school bond election held in district i. The sample 
is cross sectional. Estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
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Table 4.5: Explanation of the negative effect of property values 
 
 
                   Approval Share 
 
 
Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
Property value per pupil -0.1667 
 
-0.2158 
 
(0.1158) 
 
(0.1238)* 
Dispersion -0.067 
  
 
(0.0303)**  
  Tax rate 
  
3.5458 
   
(4.1518) 
Years  0.0096 
 
0.0085 
 
(0.0043)** 
 
(0.0043)** 
Past bond success 0.1944 
 
0.1919 
 
(0.0225)*** 
 
(0.0246)*** 
Bond value per pupil -0.0515 
 
-0.0484 
 
(0.019)*** 
 
(0.0193)** 
Enrollment growth 0.4801 
 
0.5338 
 
(0.3968) 
 
(0.4155) 
Population -0.0293 
 
-0.0367 
 
(0.0381) 
 
(0.0321) 
College or above 0.1882 
 
0.3597 
 
(0.3174) 
 
(0.2976) 
Black -0.1641 
 
-0.1594 
 
(0.0923)* 
 
(0.1214) 
Suburb -0.0283 
 
-0.0432 
 
(0.0491) 
 
(0.0796) 
Rural remote -0.1327 
 
-0.1533 
 
(0.0648)** 
 
(0.0926)* 
Rural fringe -0.0076 
 
-0.0228 
 
(0.0564) 
 
(0.0893) 
Rural distant -0.0564 
 
-0.0732 
 
(0.0561) 
 
(0.0914) 
Town fringe -0.0719 
 
-0.0918 
 
(0.0512) 
 
(0.0916) 
Town distant -0.0519 
 
-0.0709 
 
(0.0593) 
 
(0.0915) 
Constant 0.5452 
 
0.3304 
 
(0.2778)** 
 
(0.2416) 
N 132 
 
132 
Adjusted R2 0.5072 
 
0.4879 
 
Note: the unit of observation is a consolidated school bond election held in district i. The sample 
is cross sectional. Estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
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Table 4.6: IV results, upper bound values 
 
                            
Variables 
 
Approval Share 
 
 
   Property value per pupil 
 
-0.2215 
  
(0.1028)** 
Years  
 
0.0145 
  
(0.0031)*** 
Past bond success 
 
0.1642 
  
(0.0228)*** 
Bond value per pupil 
 
-0.0474 
  
(0.0181)*** 
Enrollment growth 
 
0.666 
  
(0.4483) 
Population 
 
-0.0365 
  
(0.0218)* 
College or above 
 
0.4221 
  
(0.02496)* 
Black 
 
-0.1461 
  
(0.046)*** 
Suburb 
 
-0.0493 
  
(0.0523) 
Rural remote 
 
-0.1762 
  
(0.0591)*** 
Rural fringe 
 
-0.0496 
  
(0.0579) 
Rural distant 
 
-0.0958 
  
(0.0567)* 
Town fringe 
 
-0.105 
  
(0.0571)* 
Town distant 
 
-0.0909 
  
(0.0609) 
Constant 
 
0.3596 
  
(0.2221) 
   N 
 
132 
R2 
 
0.476 
 
Note: the unit of observation is a consolidated school bond election held in district i. The sample 
is cross sectional. Estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
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Table 4.7: IV results, lower bound values 
 
                            
Variables 
 
Approval Share 
 
 
   Property value per pupil 
 
-0.2506 
  
(0.1135)** 
Years  
 
0.0148 
  
(0.0032)*** 
Past bond success 
 
0.1633 
  
(0.0229)*** 
Bond value per pupil 
 
-0.0479 
  
(0.0184)*** 
Enrollment growth 
 
0.5869 
  
(0.4552) 
Population 
 
-0.0388 
  
(0.0227)* 
College or above 
 
0.4248 
  
(0.02565)* 
Black 
 
-0.1648 
  
(0.048)*** 
Suburb 
 
-0.0616 
  
(0.0578) 
Rural remote 
 
-0.1788 
  
(0.0632)*** 
Rural fringe 
 
-0.0596 
  
(0.0639) 
Rural distant 
 
-0.1055 
  
(0.0619)* 
Town fringe 
 
-0.114 
  
(0.0616)* 
Town distant 
 
-0.0975 
  
(0.0653) 
Constant 
 
0.4131 
  
(0.2366)* 
   N 
 
132 
R2 
 
0.4624 
 
Note: the unit of observation is a consolidated school bond election held in district i. The sample 
is cross sectional. Estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
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Figure 4.1: Calculation of property taxes 
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Figure 4.3 Bond approval shares and log property values  
 
Source: Rogers and Burge (2010), Stephen H. McDonald and Associates, and American Community 
Survey, U.S. Census Bureau. 
Note: the sample is cross sectional, with a total of 132 observations. 
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Figure 4.4 Community heterogeneity and log property values 
 
Source: Rogers and Burge (2010), Stephen H. McDonald and Associates, and American Community 
Survey, U.S. Census Bureau. 
Note: the sample is cross sectional, with a total of 132 observations. 
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Figure 4.5 Tax rates and log property values  
 
Source: Rogers and Burge (2010), Stephen H. McDonald and Associates, and American Community 
Survey, U.S. Census Bureau. 
Note: the sample is cross sectional, with a total of 132 observations 
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